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ABSTRACT
The ease of programmability in Software-Defined Networking (SDN) makes it a
great platform for implementation of various initiatives that involve application
deployment, dynamic topology changes, and decentralized network management in
a multi-tenant data center environment. However, implementing security solutions
in such an environment is fraught with policy conflicts and consistency issues with
the hardness of this problem being affected by the distribution scheme for the SDN
controllers.
In this dissertation, a formalism for flow rule conflicts in SDN environments is
introduced. This formalism is realized in Brew, a security policy analysis framework
implemented on an OpenDaylight SDN controller. Brew has comprehensive conflict
detection and resolution modules to ensure that no two flow rules in a distributed SDN-
based cloud environment have conflicts at any layer; thereby assuring consistent conflict-
free security policy implementation and preventing information leakage. Techniques
for global prioritization of flow rules in a decentralized environment are presented,
using which all SDN flow rule conflicts are recognized and classified. Strategies for
unassisted resolution of these conflicts are also detailed. Alternately, if administrator
input is desired to resolve conflicts, a novel visualization scheme is implemented to
help the administrators view the conflicts in an aesthetic manner. The correctness,
feasibility and scalability of the Brew proof-of-concept prototype is demonstrated.
Flow rule conflict avoidance using a buddy address space management technique
is studied as an alternate to conflict detection and resolution in highly dynamic
cloud systems attempting to implement an SDN-based Moving Target Defense (MTD)
countermeasures.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Pervasiveness of Internet has resulted in nearly 40% of the global population using
this technology to revolutionize the way we do business, socialize, gain knowledge,
and entertain ourselves [1]. This widespread proliferation of the Internet has driven
the need for mechanisms to secure our sensitive data and communication. It has been
obvious for a while that security has no single solution, and defense in depth is a
strategy that has long been in use [2]. Strong security controls coupled with audit,
administrative reviews, and an effective security response plan is the only way anyone
can achieve a holistic defense. An oft ignored but essential component of a security
infrastructure is ensuring that devices are operating the way the administrators expect
them to. For example, consider a firewall. These are foremost amongst the multitude
of security devices that have earned their place in our networks. For firewalls to be an
effective component of the security mechanism, active management of the firewalls,
prevention of conflicts and achieving consistency between the corporate security policy
and the implemented firewall rules are all crucial.
Information security often associates itself with three primary objectives [3]: a) con-
fidentiality or secrecy relates to measures undertaken to ensure information is not
accessible to the unauthorized entities; b) integrity, which is concerned with maintain-
ing the consistency, accuracy, and trustworthiness of information over its life cycle;
and c) availability, which involves ensuring that authorized entities have access to
the information as designed. While the underlying network and technologies used to
deliver the information changes, the objectives of information security remain intact.
This has been true even after the advent of Software-Defined Networking (SDN) in
the mid-2000s.
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SDN is a transformative approach to network design and implementation, based
on the premise of separating the control of network functions from the network devices
themselves (switches, routers, firewalls, load balancers, etc.). By separating the
control and the data planes, the goal was to unleash the true capability of software
in managing networks and removing the constraints placed on them by hardware.
Using the OpenFlow protocol, SDN switches can leverage the flexibility afforded by
the ability to access header information from several layers of the Open Systems
Interconnection (OSI) stack, allowing it to satisfy functionalities traditionally fulfilled
by a multitude of physical devices. Along with the SDN support of programmable
network interfaces, this flexibility makes SDN an ideal platform for multi-tenant
data center deployments that require flexibility and dynamism in configuration and
deployment. This is especially true in an Infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) cloud
where Virtual Machines (VMs) are managed by tenants seeking technological and
financial flexibility. Adoption of Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) architectures in
modern enterprise environments adds further dynamicity and topology changes.
The decoupling of data and control planes in SDN brings about scalability concerns
owing to potential bottlenecks at the controller. Studies suggest that although a
centralized controller can scale for a respectable enterprise network, it would fail for
a data center deployment [4, 5]. While researchers have explored architectures for
decentralizing the SDN architecture [6, 7, 8, 9] they do not completely address flow
rule management across this environment.
The flexibility and programmability of SDN allows for the ability to respond rapidly
to changing user and security requirements and empowers users in a shared tenant
environment to secure their own logical infrastructure in a perceivably private manner.
Any security implementation by the tenant such as Intrusion Detection Systems
(IDS), Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS), Deep Packet Inspection (DPI), Virtual
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Private Networks (VPN), Moving Target Defense (MTD) etc., would be accomplished
by installing new flow rules in the SDN-based environment. However, the shared
control plane leaves open the potential for conflicts between flow rules from different
tenants. Further, unlike traditional environments where new rules can get added only
through an administrator, abstraction of the data plane from the control plane leads to
applications being able to introduce new flow rules into the controller through an API.
When done in an adversarial manner or without understanding existing flow rules
and the desired security policy, this could result in potential flow rule conflicts. In a
decentralized SDN-based environment with multiple controllers, the policy conflict
issue is amplified since conflicts could arise due to different controllers not being
in sync, and not having the same view of the environment especially in multi-path
scenarios. To complicate matters further, a dynamically changing network topology
adds its own wrinkles.
Just as firewall conflicts in a traditional network limits effectiveness of a security
infrastructure [10], conflicts between flow rules on the controller limits the effectiveness
and impact of a security implementation in an SDN-based environment1. Amongst
issues that are heightened in an SDN-based cloud environment are issues caused by
flow rule chaining, partial matches and by set-field actions.
Substantial research has attempted to address the problems brought forth above,
significant amongst which are FortNOX [11] and the FlowGuard [12] framework.
While they deal effectively with direct flow violations, they do not tackle conflicts
across addresses over multiple layers. For instance, consider a multi-tenant SDN-based
environment. Often, tenants use flat layer-2 topologies due to latency concerns, and
the ability to conduct inline promiscuous monitoring using layer-2 devices [13]. A
1SDN-based environments are typically prevalent in multi-tenant data center environments or
public cloud deployments. Since architectures of both of these have several common features, cloud
environments and multi-tenant data centers are used interchangeably in this dissertation.
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natural extension would be to implement layer-2 flow rule policies. The data center
itself might operate with flow rules based on layer-3 addresses. If different policy
enforcement points enforce policies based on addresses in different layers, inconsistent
actions could result. Conflicts across multiple OSI layer addresses or cross-layer
conflicts become severe in an SDN setup where each SDN switch, both physical and
virtual, can be considered to be a distributed firewall instance, each with a different
local view of the environment and policy.
I. Research Objectives & Contributions
In this dissertation, I first classify all potential conflicts in an SDN-based environ-
ment (including the hitherto unstudied cross-layer conflicts [14]). A methodology and
implementation of a controller-based algorithm for extracting flow rules in a distributed
controller environment, and detecting intra- and inter-table flow rule conflicts utilizing
cross-layer conflict checking is detailed. Further, automatic and assisted conflict
resolution mechanisms are discussed, and a novel visualization scheme for conflict
representation is described. This work is implemented in a security policy analysis
framework named Brew, built on an OpenDaylight (ODL) based SDN controller,
that effectively scrubs the flow table in a distributed SDN-based cloud environment,
highlights and resolves potential conflicts. To summarize, I accomplish the following:
• Extend firewall rule conflict classification in a traditional environment to SDN
flow rule conflicts by identifying cross-layer conflicts (which tend to be transient
in nature).
• Includes techniques for global prioritization of flow rules in a decentralized
environment depending on the decentralization strategy.
• Implement a flow rule conflict detection system in a multiple, decentralized
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controller based SDN-based cloud environment, amongst flow rules implementing
Quality of Service (QoS) requirements.
• Provide strategies for unassisted resolution of flow rule conflicts, with the
recognition that some conflicts may not be resolved without loss of information.
• Present a visualization scheme, implemented to help the administrators view
flow rule conflicts graphically.
Finally, to generate conflict free countermeasures in an address hopping based
MTD solution, knowledge from the conflict classification information and an address
space management module was used. This module was part of a framework called
CaCTuS that generates address hopping MTD countermeasures that are provably
conflict-free.
II. Dissertation Organization
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses background informa-
tion about security policy management and SDN that is fundamental to understanding
the rest of this dissertation. It also discusses related work. Chapter 3 provides details
about flow rules, implementing security policies using flow rules, and flow rule man-
agement challenges. It then produces a formalism that defines all flow rule conflicts.
Cross-layer conflicts and traffic management flow rules are also considered. Next,
Chapter 4 discusses distributed SDN controller considerations. Chapter 5 discusses
major conflict resolution techniques. These works are consolidated and presented as
part of a framework called Brew. Brew is described, analyzed and evaluated in Chap-
ter 6. In Chapter 7 a prototype for generation of conflict-free MTD countermeasure is
discussed. Finally, Chapter 8 details conclusions from this dissertation, and lays out a
plan for ongoing and future research.
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Chapter 2
BACKGROUND AND STATE OF THE ART
In this chapter, background information required to follow concepts covered in this
dissertation, specifically security policy management and SDN are described. A brief
overview of related works is also presented.
I. Evolution of Security Infrastructures
For over two centuries, the term firewall has been used to describe barriers that
prevented or slowed the spread of an undesirable event, with initial use of the word in
its literal sense. A lexicographical study of the term will show that the literal meaning
of this term has faded from our vocabulary in the current information age. This
dissertation uses the term firewall in its new data security connotation. Undoubtedly,
firewalls are the most well understood and widely deployed security device in networks
with near unanimous adoption.
Over the last few decades, firewalls have evolved from mere routers that separated
networks from one another [15] to isolate undesirable events into devices that can
conduct a multitude of actions on incoming traffic based on a security policy. Based
on general functionality and complexity firewalls can be classified as belonging to five
generations: a) first generation devices which began with routers that separated
out different networks, and evolved into devices with basic packet filtering functions;
b) second generation of firewalls which started with devices having capability to
conduct stateful packet inspections, and moved into devices which perform DPI and
application proxy functions; c) third generation screened network firewalls which had
integrated perimeter security components; d) fourth generation firewalls which were
essentially distributed firewall implementations; and e) fifth generation devices, which
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are programmable middleboxes that can serve in a variety of roles, many of which
include roles satisfied by traditional firewalls. Figure 2.1 shows this evolution and
progression visually.
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Figure 2.1: Firewall Evolution Timeline.
By design, a firewall is meant to act as a gate of sorts to traffic between the public
Internet and private networks, thereby preventing network mishaps. Conventionally,
they are thought to: a) be at the boundary between two different networks; and
b) be examining every packet traversing this border, irrespective of whether the traffic
inbound, or outbound. Using a set of security policies that have been defined by a
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network administrator, this firewall determines which packets to allow, and which
to block. These security policies are converted into firewall rules, with each rule
consisting of the network 4-tuple (IP Source Address, IP Destination Address, IP
Source Port, IP Destination Port), network protocol and associated action.
As data networks grow in size and complexity, their risk tolerance decreases. At
the same time, this increasing scale has resulted in specification and management of
firewall policies to become complex and an error-prone task. For instance, a centralized
firewall located at the ingress into the network may have very strict default policies.
If users want to use a service which requires opening new ports on the central firewall,
the administrator may refuse to accommodate him/her due to the massive impact
of one change. The potential of having to add individual rules for running home
grown applications adds complexity to the rule-set, and hence increases the chance
of introducing errors. Moreover, the information threat model has evolved to where
organizations are aware that many of the vulnerabilities and threats are internal in
nature [16]. To counter this new reality, organizations use layered firewalls where
internal environments are separated from one another by using firewalls or related
security devices to reduce malicious activities originating internally. Such a layered
implementation of firewalls requires a separation of security policy controls into trusted,
semi-trusted and untrusted networks.
To try and resolve these problems while affording us all the advantages of firewalls,
Bellovin [17] proposes the use of distributed firewalls. In his solution, the security policy
is still centrally defined. However, enforcing this security policy is the prerogative of
distributed nodes (or endpoints, per Bellovin [17]). Such a distributed firewall model
requires three components: a) a policy language, that states what connections are
permitted and prohibited; b) a system management tool that can change security
policy and enforce it; and c) a secure distribution mechanism that can safely distribute
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the security policy to all the nodes in the distributed firewall. In his model, a compiler
would translate the security policy from the policy language into some internal format.
The system management tool, which works in a client-server framework, would then
distribute this policy to all the distributed firewall nodes.
In the modern enterprises, it is very common to have multiple firewalls which
decentralize the implementation of the desired security policy [10]. And, as suggested
by Bellovin [17], the security policy is defined and enforced at different locations. Such
a setup allows for the system administrators to remain in control of the security policy,
while freeing them from the pain of consistent implementation of the policy across
multiple devices. Moreover, with the rise of the cloud computing model, multi-tenant
data center environments have witnessed explosive growth. In such environments, the
data center provider would have a central security policy, with each tenant potentially
having their own additional security measures. Managing and implementing these
policies in a consistent manner is challenging.
II. Security Policy Management
Security policy management can be thought of as the framework for specification of
an authentication and authorization policy, and the translation of this policy into infor-
mation that can be used by devices to control access, management of key distribution,
audit of security activities and information leakage [18]. This authorization usually
pertains to permitting or denying access to resources or information [19]. Security
management almost always also includes actions to be taken if any violations are
detected.
Given the rapid growth in the scale of networks being deployed, traditional methods
which rely on trained personnel to implement and manage information security has
become more time consuming, and error-prone [20]. Maintaining a mandated network
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security scheme for large scale data center networks and distributed environments
is a formidable challenge. It is to this end that several policy-driven management
techniques have been suggested [21]. By separating out security policies from their
low level implementation and enforcement in the network, such methodologies simplify
network management while paving the way for seamless growth of the network [22, 23].
The definition of policy itself is rather ambiguous and is often something of
debate. Policies could be thought of as a specific way to dynamically implement static
requirements [24]. Separating out the policy from the requirement enables them to be
altered and adjusted to the environment or modified to improve performance, all the
while ensuring that they still adhere to the requirement. In fact, the requirement can
be used as a gauge to verify the functionality of the policy. A policy hierarchy that
represents the relationships between different levels of policy abstractions, as shown
in Figure 2.2, is generally accepted to be [3, 25, 26, 27]:
• Requirements, high-level abstract policies or management goals: These are
generally natural language statements such as Service Level Agreements (SLA)
or business goals. They are usually not enforceable at a device level, and are
implemented using a lower abstraction level.
• Specification-level or network-level policies: These are specified by a human
administrator in a precise format to provide abstractions for device-level imple-
mentations. These policies must be specific enough to drive automation.
• Low-level policies or device configurations: These are implemented on the devices
themselves. These are often the bottleneck to both scalability, performance and
interoperability.
The level of policy most relevant to our study is specification-level policy, or network
policy. We adopt the definition of a network policy from the work of Damianou [3].
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Definition 2.1. A network policy consists of rules which define relationships between
network resources and the network elements that provide those resources. Network
policies manage and control the accessibility, reliability and the QoS experienced by
networked applications and users.
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) policy model [28] specifies that
network policies be considered as rules that specify actions to be taken when certain
conditions are met, described by the syntax in Listing 2.1.
Listing 2.1: IETF Network Policy
IF <condition(s)> THEN <action(s)>
While the syntax described follows the Condition-Action paradigm of most Policy
Core Information Model (PCIM) [19] rules, flow rules written in this syntax follow
similar semantics to an obligation [3] in the form of an Event-Condition-Action (ECA)
paradigm [29] from event-driven architectures, with an implicit event trigger in case
of a match. To help determine the action set when multiple conditions are met, most
policies are associated with a priority value. Alternately, instead of specifying an
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explicit priority, a role-based priority may be assigned to the policies depending on
the origination point of the policy.
A typical policy-based management architecture as per the PCIM is shown in
Figure 2.3. A Policy Manager (PM), serves to facilitate policy formulation, analysis
and verification. Once verified, the policies are stored in a Policy Repository (PR).
The Policy Decision Point (PDP) actively monitors the system for specific events.
When triggered by certain conditions, the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) comes
into play - to enforce the policy actions.
Policy 
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Policy 
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Policy 
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Policy Administration 
Point
Policy Enforcement 
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Manage 
Policies
Figure 2.3: Policy Management Framework.
Several issues with regards to policy definition and implementation, such as policy
storage and enforcement in a distributed environment are addressed natively in SDN,
wherein the SDN controller can act as a PR and PDP, while the SDN switches can
act as the PEP. A brief overview on SDN follows.
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III. Software-Defined Networks (SDN)
The SDN paradigm is based on the premise that separating control of network
functions from the network devices themselves (switches, routers, firewalls, etc.) can
address several limitations associated with today’s vertically integrated, closed and
proprietary networking infrastructure. The adoption of virtualization technologies
in computing, and the convergence of voice, video and data communication to IP
networks fueled the need for such a shift in networking standards [30]. Figure 2.4
shows a typical network implemented using SDN in a data center environment. Four
users have VMs running on the same physical host, with each VM connected to the
same Open Virtual Switch (OVS) (described in Section III.B). Data frames that come
from the VMs are tagged with a VLAN ID or some other ID based on the tunneling
protocol in use, logically separating each of the four users. The OVS then uses flow
rules it gets from the SDN controller to determine how to handle the traffic.
VM
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VM
VM
Virtual 
Machines
SDN 
Controller
Physical 
Network
Internet
OpenFlow
Physical 
Server Farm
OVS
Figure 2.4: Typical Network Implemented Using SDN.
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The separation of the control and data planes result in network switches becoming
dumb forwarding devices, with control logic being implemented in a centralized1
controller [31]. This not only allows the network administrators a much finer gran-
ularity of control over traffic flow, but also empowers them to respond to changing
network requirements in a dynamic environment [32] in a much more effective manner.
Figure 2.5 shows a simplified view of the SDN architecture.
Infrastructure layer
Network Operating System
Control layer
Southbound API
Application layer
App 1 App 2 App 3 App n
. . .
Northbound API
Figure 2.5: Abstraction in SDN.
1The controller only needs to be logically centralized. This may be implemented in a physically
centralized or distributed system [6].
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Use of SDN has picked up steam due to the following benefits:
• The traffic patterns culminating from the adoption of cloud systems and big-data
computing do not adhere to the traditional notion of a north-south network.
• Separating network control from the hardware devices eliminates the need to
configure each device individually. Having a central network policy that can be
dispatched to the SDN devices reduces the time-to-deploy thereby enhancing
profits for the data center or service providers.
• Since control is separated from the network devices, administrators can modify
the behavior of the device by pushing software updates to the device, instead
of conducting fork-lift upgrades - once again enhancing profits for data center
providers.
• A singular device can handle the functionalities managed by multiple traditional
network devices. For example, a single device could do switching, routing, load
balancing and security functions. Further, SDN is vendor agnostic, thereby
allowing providers more flexibility.
• SDN can organically provide traffic shaping and administer QoS. In current
networks, provisioning different QoS levels for different applications is a highly
manual process, and can not dynamically adapt to changing network conditions
[33].
• SDN provides a layer of abstraction that allows application managers and
administrators to dissociate from managing the physical hardware. In addition
to having access to virtual disk and memory, SDN virtualizes a network operating
system, abstracting the physical topology of the network from the applications.
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As shown in Figure 2.5, several applications running on the same physical
hardware could have different views of the network.
There are several definitions for a flow in literature. IP Flow Information eXport
(IPFIX) [34] describes a flow to be a set of IP packets with a set of common properties
passing an observation point in the network during a certain time interval. The typical
properties of a flow include the network 4-tuple <source IP, source port, destination
IP, destination port>, and the layer-4 protocol. A flow table is a listing of rules
managing these flows. Thus, a flow table can, quite simply be thought of as a set of
packet filtering rules. The description of a flow, however, needs to be extended to
include not just the network 4-tuple, but a network 6-tuple which includes the OSI
layer-2 source and destination addresses. Our formal definition of a flow is detailed in
Chapter 3, Section II.
The SDN switches communicate with the controller over a secure TCP connection
on a dedicated control network, separate from the data transfer network. The switches
maintain at least one flow table, consisting of match conditions and associated actions.
An ingress packet is matched against the flow table entries to select the entry that
first matches (or a different rule selection type as discussed in Chapter 3, Section II)
the ingress packet, and the associated instruction is executed. Such an instruction
may explicitly direct the packet to another flow table, where the same process is
repeated. When processing stops, the packet is processed with its associated action
set. Figure 2.6 shows a visual representation of this process.
In addition to being deployed for a variety of traditional functionalities like routing,
security and load balancing, SDN can be used for traffic engineering, end-to-end QoS
enforcement, mobility management, data center implementation and reducing power
consumption. Kreutz et al. [35] groups all these applications into five categories:
a) traffic engineering; b) mobility and wireless; c) measurement and monitoring;
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d) security; and e) data center networking. This dissertation emphasizes the application
of SDN for security, and how shoddy flow rule management could cause security issues.
The programmability and flexibility offered by the SDN paradigm brings about
a great potential upside for security processing, primarily because it offers an end-
to-end, service-oriented connectivity model that is not bound by traditional routing
constraints. Centralized, holistic knowledge of the environment means security policies
can consolidate information from a diverse set of devices to deal with various threats.
Policy management in SDN can be based on application, service, organization, and
geographical criteria rather than physical configuration, thereby insulating security
administration from enforcement.
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A. OpenFlow
OpenFlow, defined by the Open Network Foundation (ONF) [36], is a protocol
between the control and forwarding layers of an SDN architecture, and is by far the
most widespread implementation of SDN. A basic OpenFlow architecture consists
of end hosts, a controller and OpenFlow enabled switches. Note that contrary to
the traditional network nomenclature, an OpenFlow switch is not limited to being a
layer-2 device. The controller communicates with the switches using an OpenFlow
API.
When a packet arrives at an OpenFlow switch, packets are processed as follows:
1. A flow table lookup attempting to match the header fields of the packet in
question to the local flow table is done. If no matching entry is present, then the
packet is sent to the controller for processing. When multiple entries that match
the incoming packet are present in the flow table, the packet with the highest
priority is picked. Details about the match fields and actions are provided in
Chapter 3.
2. Byte and packet counters are updated.
3. Action(s) corresponding to the matching flow rule is(are) appended to the action
set. If a different flow table is part of the execution chain, then processing
continues.
4. Once all flow tables have been processed, execute the action set.
B. Open Virtual Switch (OVS)
Open Virtual Switch (OVS) [37] is open-source implementation of a distributed
programmable virtual multilayer switch. OVS implementations generally consist of
18
flow tables, with each flow entry having match conditions and associated actions.
OVS communicates with the controller using a secure channel, and generally uses the
OpenFlow protocol. OVS has been widely integrated into major cloud orchestration
systems such as OpenStack [38], CloudStack [39] etc., in lieu of the traditional Linux
bridge.
Figure 2.7 represents the main components of OVS. The kernel module receives
the packets from a NIC (physical or virtual). If the kernel module knows how to
handle the packet, it simply follows the instructions. If not, the packet is sent to the
ovs-vswitchd in userspace using NetLink. This determines how the packet should
be handled using the OpenFlow protocol. The ovs-vswitchd communicates with a
ovsdb-server via a socket. The ovsdb-server stores OVS configuration and switch
management data in JSON format. All functions in the userspace can be accomplished
using CLI commands.
OVS and vSwitch are used interchangeably in the remainder of this document.
IV. Related Work
A. Firewall Rule Conflicts
There have been several attempts to classify policy conflicts. Lupu and Morris
[40, 41]. Lupu et al. describe conflict analysis for management policies, using a tool
to conduct offline detection of conflicts in a large-scale distributed system. Eppstein
and Muthukrishnan [42] use a deal with the packet classification and filter conflict
detection problem. They use KD tree [43] to verify if two rules apply different actions
on the same packet. This misses out on some conflict classification types, that involve
sub-optimal rules. Fu et al. [24] manage policies as they apply to IPSec tunnels
in both inter- and intra-domain environments. Hari et al. [44] present a conflict
detection and resolution algorithm using a k-tuple filter that grows linearly. However,
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the seminal work by Al-Shaer and Hamed [45] is often used to classify firewall conflicts.
In that work, the authors also introduce the Firewall Policy Editor to provide a simple
representation allowing for easy human recognition of firewall rule conflicts. The
authors extend this work into a distributed environment in Firewall Policy Advisor
(FPA) [10], which identifies where to insert new firewall rules to not incur any new
policy conflicts. In FPA, the authors also introduce basic visualization by displaying
simplified versions of complex firewall rules, and show firewall rule conflicts in tabular
format.
Firmato [13] is a firewall management toolkit that helps users separate out security
policy and the underlying network topology. It uses a Model Definition Language
(MDL) to translate the security model into configuration files for Lucent managed
firewalls. Firmato ensures there are no policy conflicts in the system and that the
rules in the firewall are up to date with the security policy. Fireman [46] detects
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misconfiguration stemming from: a) violations of user-specified security policies;
and b) inconsistencies among firewall rules. It parses firewall configurations and
converts them into an operational semantics representation, which is then sent to the
administrator for decision making. Unlike FPA, Fireman also recognizes inter-firewall
rule conflicts.
FAME [47] is a conflict management environment to detect and resolve conflicts
by using rule based segmentation. In FAME, the authors used a matrix to represent
conflicting and non-conflicting address segments; but fails while trying to represent
larger rule sets.
V. Capretta et al. [48] proposed a formalization of conflict detection for firewalls,
but constrained themselves to only look at rules where the actions are different; thereby
missing out on some conflict classes. Rei [49] is a language based on deontic logic [50]
that defines security policies as possible actions on a resource. All policies in Rei are
free of conflicts due to the presence of meta-policies defined by an administrator, which
are used to resolve conflicts. If a meta-policy that covers the conflict does not exist, by
default the deny action is prioritized. FLIP [51] is a high-level firewall configuration
policy language in which security policies are translated into lower level configuration
to be loaded onto the devices. Since FLIP is a centralized configuration generation
point, the rules generated will be conflict-free due to FLIP preventing overlap of any
kind [52].
Fang [53] is a tool that reads in the vendor specific configuration files and converts
them into an internal representation, which is then be presented to the administrator
in a tabular form in simple text. While it is one of the earliest work in visualization
of rule conflicts, it is devoid of any graphics. While it is a step to making security
configurations vendor agnostic, it does not display any relation between conflicting
rules. The onus is on an experienced administrator to submit the right query that
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would present the conflict. PolicyVis [54] used overlapping bars to represent conflict
types, and colors to represent the action. However, the conflicts are visible only when
a certain scope is defined. A sunburst visualization is used by Mansmann et al. [55]
to visualize the rule set, but does not provide any visualization for flow rule conflicts.
None of the above works, provide scalable rule conflict visualization that provides
high-level conflict categorization, with granular information provided upon need to
the administrator.
B. SDN Security & SDN Policy Management
While advances in SDN have made it central to deployment of a cloud environment,
security mechanisms in SDN trail its applications. A basic SDN firewall was introduced
as part of Floodlight [56], wherein the first packet in a new flow is sent to the controller
to be matched against a set of flow rules. The resulting action set is then sent to
the OpenFlow switch. The action set is applied for the current flow, and cached for
enforcement on all future flows matching the same conditions. In case of a dynamic
security policy update to the controller, the OpenFlow switches are oblivious to this
situation and could implemented a dated action set. Javid et al. [57] built a layer-2
firewall for an SDN-based cloud environment using a tree topology for a small network
using a POX controller and restricted traffic flow as desired. Suh et al. [58] illustrated
a proof-of-concept version of a traditional layer-3 firewall over an SDN controller. An
application layer firewall using SDN was demonstrated by Shieha [59].
FRESCO [70] allows for the implementation of security services in an OpenFlow
environment by providing reusable modules accessible through a Python API. To
address conflicts that might arise in an OpenFlow environment, FRESCO introduces a
Security Enforcement Kernel (SEK) that prioritizes rules to assist in conflict resolution,
but does not tackle complex flow rule inconsistencies. FortNOX [11] is an extension
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to the NOX controller that implements role-based and signature based enforcement to
ensure applications running on the controller do not circumvent the existing security
policy, thereby enforcing policy compliance. In FortNOX, reusable modules are used
to protect the flow installation mechanism against adversaries, but conflict analysis
is conducted only between a new flow rule and existing rules, without considering
dependencies within flow tables. Thus, implementing FortNOX in a distributed
environment would be challenging. Decision making in FortNOX seems to follow a
least permissive strategy instead of making a decision keeping the holistic nature
of the environment in mind. Moreover, it uses only layer-3 and layer-4 information
for conflict detection, which we believe is incomplete since SDN flow rules could use
purely layer-2 addresses for decision making. In addition, FortNOX would not be able
to handle partial flow rule conflicts.
In their work, Cholvy and Cuppens [62] conduct consistency analysis of security
policies, focusing on access control policy. Much of their study focuses on defining and
ensuring security policy consistency based on deontic logic, like Rei. But paradoxes
do exist in deontic logic [63] and hence such work would be beneficial only in a
complementary manner to any security implementation involving network devices
such as firewalls.
Natarajan et al. [71] study two different conflict detection techniques for flow rules.
The first approach internally represents flow rules using a combination radix trie and
a hash, which are then used to identify conflicts. The second approach is an ontology
based detection system. However, the authors do not discuss conflicts in distributed
environments, or how to resolve any conflicts.
FlowChecker [64] identifies intra-switch conflicts within a single flow table using
Binary Decision Diagrams (BDD) [65]. Certain conflicts in SDN networks can also be
determined by expanding the work of Gu et al. [66] in detecting anomalies in network
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traffic tailored to a SDN environment. However, these would be limited to detecting
network invariants that can be detected by comparing current network traffic with a
baseline distribution.
Pyretic [67], a high-level language written in Python courtesy the Frenetic project
[68], allows users to write modular applications. Modularization ensures that rules
installed to perform one task do not override other rules. Using a mathematical
modeling approach to packet processing, Pyretic compares the list of rules as functions
that use a packet as an input, and have a set of zero or more packets as output. Given
its mathematical base, Pyretic deals effectively with direct policy conflicts, by placing
them in a prioritized rule set much like the OpenFlow flow table. However, indirect
security violations or inconsistencies in a distributed SDN environment cannot be
handled by Pyretic without a flow tracking mechanism such as the one discussed by
Fayazbakhsh et al. [69].
VeriFlow [72] is a proposed layer between the controller and switches which conducts
real time verification of rules being inserted. It uses search rules based on Equivalence
Classes (ECs) to maintain relationships and determine which policies would be affected
in case of a change. Thus, it can verify that flow rules being implemented have no
errors due to their dependence on faulty switch firmware, control plane communication,
reachability issues, configuration updates on the network, routing loops, etc. Like
VeriFlow, NetPlumber [73] sits between the controller and switches. Using header
space analysis [74], it ensures that any update to a policy is compared to all dependent
policies to prevent and report violations.
FlowGuard [12] is a security tool specifically designed to resolve security policy
violations in an OpenFlow network. FlowGuard examines incoming policy updates
and determines flow violations in addition to performing stateful monitoring. It uses
several strategies to refine policies, most of which include rejecting a violating flow.
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Research in SDN security enforcement such as AVANT-GUARD [60] allow for
development of security enforcement kernels, and threat detection to applications. In
Sphinx [61], the authors extend attack detection in SDN to include a broader class
of attacks including untrusted switches and hosts. However, these security solutions
implicitly assume the presence of a conflict-free security policy for implementation,
and do not address the problem of conflicting flow rules.
Since a flow can be defined using addresses in multiple layers, policy checking
approaches in SDN should differ from traditional approaches by being able to consider
indirect security violations, partial violations or cross-layer conflicts. However, none
of the works discussed above tackle these problems. Moreover, they appear not to
fully leverage the SDN paradigm that lets flow rules do traffic shaping in addition
to implementing accept/deny security policy. To that end, we propose Brew, a
framework that considers cross-layer dependencies while ensuring conflict-free policies
in a distributed SDN-based environment. Additionally, Brew analyzes traffic shaping
policies including rate limiting policies along with security policies to detect and
resolve direct, indirect and partial conflicts.
C. Distributed SDN Environments
Distributed controller environments in SDN are widely studied. Onix [6] facilitates
distributed control in SDN by providing each instance of the distributed controller
access to holistic network state information through an API. HyperFlow [8] synchro-
nizes the network state among the distributed controller instances while making them
believe that they have control over the entire network. Kandoo [75] is a framework
tailored for a hierarchical controller setup. It separates out local applications that
can operate using the local state of a switch, and lets the root controller handle
applications that require network-wide state. DISCO [76] is a distributed control
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plane that relies on a per domain organization, and contains an east-west interface
that manages communication with other DISCO controllers. It is highly suitable for a
hierarchically decentralized SDN controller environment. ONOS [77] is an OS that
runs on multiple servers, each of which acts as the exclusive controller for a subset
of switches and is responsible for propagating state changes between the switches it
controls.
Dixit et al. [9] presented an approach to dynamically assign switches to the con-
trollers in a multiple controller environment in in real-time. The balanced placement of
controllers can reduce the cost and the overhead for dynamic assignment of controllers.
Bari et al. [78] also presented a technique to dynamically place controllers depending
on the changes of number of flows in the network. Controller placement problems have
been studied extensively from a performance perspective [4, 79, 78, 80], and based
on resilience [81, 82, 83, 84, 85]. Several of these works serve as groundwork for the
controller decentralization strategies that are employed during the implementation of
the Brew framework.
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Chapter 3
FLOW RULE CONFLICTS
I. Flow Rules
OpenFlow v1.3.1 specifications [86] describe a flow rule to consist of the following
fields:
• Priority which describes the precedence of the rule, and is defined in the range
[1, 65535]. Higher priority values are preferred over lower values. If left unspeci-
fied, the priority field defaults to 32768.
• Match fields which consist of protocol specific header information, hardware
addresses, and metadata that is used to match incoming flows. In all, the basic
class in OpenFlow 1.3.1 can match thirty-nine different values, amongst which
thirteen values are required to be handled by all switches. These are: a) ingress
port; b) Ethernet source address; c) Ethernet destination address; d) Ethernet
type; e) IPv4 source address; f) IPv4 destination address; g) IPv6 source address;
h) IPv6 destination address; i) IPv4 or IPv6 protocol number; j) TCP source
port; k) TCP destination port; l) UDP source port; and m) UDP destination
port. The complete list of match fields is shown in Table A.1 in Appendix A.
• Packet counters which keep track of the number of packets that utilize the flow
rule, and are updated each time a packet match is detected. About forty different
counters are specified in the OpenFlow 1.3.1 specification.
• An action set that contains instructions on what to do when a matching flow
is detected. Associated actions can: a) forward packets through a specified
port; b) flood the packet on all ports; c) change QoS; d) encapsulate; e) encrypt;
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f) rate limit; g) drop the packet; and h) be customized using various set-field
actions. The action sets are carried between flow tables, in cases where pipeline
processing of flow tables is in effect. The complete list of match fields is shown
in Table B.1 in Appendix B.
• Timeouts which specify the maximum amount of time or idle time before a
switch would consider the flow rule expired.
• A cookie value chosen by the controller. This value is not visible to the switches,
and therefore not used when processing packets. It may however, be used by
the controller to filter flow statistics, flow modification and flow deletion.
Since packet counters, timeouts and cookie values are not central to handling flow
rule conflicts, in the remainder of this dissertation, we limit discussion of flow rules to
priority, match fields and actions set fields. Table 3.1 shows a sample flow table rules
with the selected fields present. The data in the table has been written to be human
readable. The mapping of the columns is as follows: a) Rule #, present only to refer
to the rules in this dissertation and not present in OpenFlow; b) Priority; c) Source
MAC, which is specified using the Ethernet source address field; d) Destination MAC,
which is specified using the Ethernet destination address field; e) Source IP, which
is specified using the IPv4 source address field; f) Destination IP, which is specified
using the IPv4 destination address field; g) Protocol, which is specified using the IPv4
protocol field; h) Source Port, which is specified using either the TCP source field or
the UDP source field; i) Destination Port, which is specified using either the TCP
destination field or the UDP destination field; and j) Action, which is specified in the
action set but simplified here to just forward and drop. All required fields, ignored in
Table 3.1 can be assumed to be wildcarded.
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II. Flow Rule Model
In order to formally create a model that describes flow rules in an SDN-based
cloud environment, an address n is defined in Definition 3.4.
Definition 3.1. A frame space of a rule r is the subset of all possible 6-byte hexadec-
imal numbers representing OSI layer-2 (MAC) addresses, and is expressed as a 2-tuple
(s, d) with subscript s denoting source and d denoting destination addresses.
Definition 3.2. A packet space of a rule r is the subset of all possible 32-bit numbers
representing OSI layer-3 (IPv4) addresses, and is expressed as a 2-tuple (ζs, ζd) with
subscript s denoting source and d denoting destination addresses.
Definition 3.3. A segment space of a rule r is the subset of all possible 16-bit numbers
representing OSI layer-4 (TCP/UDP) addresses, and is expressed as a 2-tuple (ηs, ηd)
with subscript s denoting source and d denoting destination addresses.
Definition 3.4. An address space n of a rule r is the 6-tuple representing the frame
space, packet space and segment space, and is expressed as (s, d, ζs, ζd, ηs, ηd), with
subscript s denoting source and d denoting destination addresses. An address space is
interchangeably called an address in this dissertation.
If N is the universal set of address spaces, we have:
Definition 3.5. A flow rule r is a function f : N → N that transforms n to n′, where
n′ is (′s, 
′
d, ζ
′
s, ζ
′
d, η
′
s, η
′
d) together with an associated action set a, that can have any of
the values from Appendix B. Thus,
r := f(n) a
The set-field capabilities in the action fields of the rules ensures that any, all
or none of the fields in n may be modified as a result of the transform function f .
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Considering cases where the action set a is a pointer to a different flow table, we
can apply the transform function on the result of the original transform function n′.
Formally, if r := f(n) a; f(n) = n′ and a := g(n′) a′ then,
r := g(f(n)) a′
Thus, multiple rules applied in succession to the same input address space can
simply be modeled as a composite function. It must be noted that the complexity of
the flow rule composition function would be exponential in nature, since each flow
rule could have multiple actions, each of which themselves could recursively lead to
multiple actions.
III. Security Policies using Flow Rules
Due to the ability to alter headers from multiple layers of the OSI stack, flow
rules in the OpenFlow protocol can inherently be used for traffic forwarding, routing
and traffic shaping. Research has shown that, in addition to traffic manipulation
functionalities, most security policies can be transferred into flow entries and deployed
on OpenFlow devices [87].
While several security mechanisms implemented in traditional environments depend
on routing traffic through middleboxes [88, 89, 90], it has been demonstrated that
integrating processing into the network is just as effective [91]. The centralized control
in the SDN paradigm makes can make this integration simple and elegant. Models to
implement traditional security functions such as firewall rules, an IDS and Network
Address Translation (NAT) rules in software have been demonstrated to be successful
[92, 93, 94]. SIMPLE, a framework that achieves OpenFlow based enforcement of
middlebox policies has been demonstrated in [95]. Contextual meaning to assist in
the implementation of middlebox policies using FlowTags was demonstrated in [69].
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Further, an OpenFlow based multi-level security system that implements desired
security policies using flow rules to accomplish network traffic monitoring as well as
verification of packet contents has been successfully implemented [96]. Franc¸ois et al.
survey these and several other security implementations using OpenFlow [97] .
Four of the most generic security related policies are firewall, IPS/IDS, load
balancing and NAT rules, each of which can be expressed using the flow rule tuple.
A typical firewall rule, that blocks all Telnet traffic can be specified in OpenFlow as
follows. Note that nw_proto=6 signifies TCP.
Listing 3.1: Firewall Rule Using OpenFlow.
priority =51, nw_proto=6, tp_dst =23, actions=drop
Similarly, a load balancer policy, IPS/IDS policy or a NAT policy could be
implemented by modifying the layer-3 source or destination address to send the flow
to a specific device as follows:
Listing 3.2: Load Balancer Rule Using OpenFlow.
priority =51, nw_src =10.5.50.5 , nw_dst =10.211.1.1 , actions=mod_nw_dst
=10.211.1.63 , output :3
IV. Flow Rule Management Challenges
Unlike traditional firewall rules, flow rules can match more than just OSI layer-3 and
layer-4 headers making them inherently more complex by virtue of having additional
variables to consider. Since wildcard rules are allowed in OpenFlow, a partial conflict1
of a flow policy could occur, thereby adding complexity to the resolution of conflicting
flow rules.
As discussed in Section I, actions that can be applied on a match include forwarding
to specific ports on the switch, flooding the packet, changing its QoS levels, dropping
1caused when there is a partial overlap in the address spaces of the rules, as described in Section VI
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the packet, encapsulating, encrypting, rate limiting or even customizable actions
using various set-field actions. The set-field functionality is a double-edged
sword. One the one hand, it provides flexibility and allows the OpenFlow protocol to
define complex virtual paths for traffic, and helps assert granular control. Cross-layer
interaction is bolstered by virtue of having flow rules using set-field actions to
change packet headers at several layers dynamically. But it also introduces significant
management challenges, such as the origin binding problem [69, 98].
OpenFlow specifications on how a flow match is determined are ambiguous, with
the specifications stating that an incoming packet is compared against the match
fields in priority order, and the first complete match is selected [86]. However, when
the OFPFF_CHECK_OVERLAP flag is not set in the controller, multiple flow entries with
the same priority can be set, in which case, the selected flow entry is explicitly
undefined [86]. This is often the case in multi-tenant data centers, since setting the
OFPFF_CHECK_OVERLAP flag would result in capping the size of each flow table to
65, 535 entries. When multiple matching rules with the same priority are encountered,
directions on how to deal with the issue are unclear, and not standard across different
implementations. While some implementations install sensible behavior such as more
specific flows taking precedence over less specific flows, this is not specified in the
OpenFlow specification [86], and not implemented in OVS. For instance, the only
constraint OVS places requires flow descriptions to be in normal form, i.e., a flow
can specify details for a particular layer header only if the protocol field in its lower
layers are populated. That is, if the layer-2 protocol type dl_type is wildcarded,
indicating use of any layer-3 protocol, then the flow rule can not specify layer-3 IPv4
source and destination addresses. But, this requirement only does not prevent conflict
causing scenarios. Furthermore, research has shown that despite there being clear
prioritization rules in OpenFlow, certain hardware OpenFlow switches ignore priorities
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and treat rules installed later as more important [99]. Needless to say, ambiguity is
highly undesirable in any security implementation, and preventing conflicts in flow
rules is key.
Security implementations using SDN leverage the ability to make dynamic changes
to the network and system configurations to have a lean, agile and secure environ-
ment. Since this usually results in environments that are constantly in flux, ensuring
synchronization of the flow rules on all the distributed controllers is challenging. As
and when the logical topology changes, the flow rules in place must be modified in
accordance to ensure policy compliance. Additionally, ensuring that the changing flow
rules are always in line with the security policy of the organization is not trivial [100].
Finally, flow rules in an SDN environment can be generated by any number of
applications rather than just from an administrator. While this can reduce the workload
on the administrator and help with chronic complexity management, there exists a
potential for misplaced priorities between some of the flow rule generation points.
Besides, an application acting maliciously can wreak havoc across the environment
if not detected early enough [101]. Having multiple applications with the ability to
concurrently update flow rules can lead to unexpected conditions if the holistic nature
of the environment is not considered. For example, consider a load balancing and
a DPI application running on the controller. If the DPI detects an intrusion on a
node, it would attempt to migrate traffic off it. However, if the load balancer was
responsible for allocating new incoming connections to the device with the fewest
number of active connections, it might effectively sabotage the attempts of the DPI
program.
To summarize, flow rule management is more complex than rule management in a
traditional environment because:
• Match conditions cover more fields than in traditional environments.
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• The set-field actions lead to cross-layer interaction in SDN flows.
• Flow rule priority field is not unique, and there is no standard on how to handle
flow rules with the same priority.
• Ensuring synchronicity of rules in a multiple controller environment is not trivial
when the topology is constantly changing.
• There are multiple generation points for flow rules, and there exist potential for
some of the generation points to not have the same priorities as the administrator.
V. Motivating Scenarios
One of the major benefits of using SDN to implement a cloud environment is the
ability to have multiple applications run on the SDN controller, each of which has
complete knowledge of the cloud environment. This can be leveraged by the cloud
provider to provide Security-as-a-Service (SaaS). A few potential examples of services
in a SaaS suite are Firewalls, VPN, IDS, IPS, MTD, etc. Implementing a management
system that only specifies security policies without tackling topological interaction
amongst constituent members has always been a recipe for conflicts [24].
With the SDN controller having visibility into the entire system topology along with
the policies being implemented, several of the conflict causing scenarios in traditional
networks were handled. However, there are several instances where conflicts can
creep into the flow table such as policy inconsistencies caused by: a) service chain
processing where multiple flow tables that handle the same flow might have conflicting
actions; b) VPN implementations that modify header content could result in flow rules
being inadvertently being applied to a certain flow; c) flow rule injection by different
modules (using the northbound API provided by the controller) could have conflicting
actions for the same flow; d) matching on different OSI layer addresses resulting in
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different actions; and e) administrator error. This list, while incomplete, goes to show
how prevalent policy conflicts in SDN-based cloud environments could be.
Three distinct case studies in an SDN-based cloud environment where the security
of the environment is put at risk due to flow rule conflicts are discussed next. The
first scenario serves as an example where rules from different applications conflict
with each other, and the second scenario serves as an example where rules from a
single module might cause conflicts due to the dynamism in the environment. The
last scenario once again discusses how inconsistent view of the network state results
in different applications inserting flow rules with incomplete information.
A. Case Study 1: Moving Target Defense (MTD)
Traditional approaches to addressing security issues in a dynamic, distributed
environment concerned themselves with implementing security through individual com-
ponents, and not considering security holistically. This leads to two critical weaknesses:
a) defense against insider attack is minimal; and thus b) when perimeter defenses fail,
internal systems are ripe for the picking. As a counter, security applications that
implement MTD is a topic that is hotly researched.
MTD techniques have been devised as a tactic wherein security of a cloud environ-
ment is enhanced by having a rapidly evolving system with a variable attack surface,
giving defenders an information advantage [102]. An effective countermeasure used
in MTD is network address switching [103], which can be accomplished in SDN with
great ease. Since an MTD application could dynamically and rapidly inject new flow
rules into an environment, it could lead to conflicts between the new and old flow
rules.
In the data center network shown in Figure 3.1, we have Tenant A hosting a web
farm. Being security conscious, only traffic on TCP port 443 is allowed into the IP
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addresses that belong to the web servers. When an attack directed against host A2
has been detected, the MTD application responds with countermeasures and takes
two actions: a) a new web server (host A3) is spawned to handle the load of host A2;
and b) the IP for host A2 is migrated to the Honeypot network and assigned to host
Z1.
Data Center
Internet
Offload 
A2 to A3
Host A1 Host A2
Host A3
Host Z1
Tenant A
HoneyPot
OVS1
OVS2
Quarantine A2's IP
VM VM
VM
VM
Controller
Figure 3.1: Policy Conflicts in SDN-based Cloud Caused by MTD.
To run forensics, isolate and incapacitate the attacker, the Honeypot network
permits all inbound traffic, but restricts egress traffic to other sections of the data
center. These actions result in new flow rules being injected into the flow table that:
a) permits all traffic inbound to the IP that originally belonged to host A2, but now
belongs to host Z1; b) modifies an incoming packet’s destination address from host
A2 to host A3 if the source is considered to be a non-adversarial source; c) stops all
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outbound traffic from the IP that originally belonged to host A2, but now belongs to
host Z1 to the rest of the data center; and d) permits traffic on port 443 to host A3.
The original policy allowing only port 443 to the IP of host A2, and the new policy
allowing all traffic to the IP address of host Z1 are now in conflict.
B. Case Study 2: VPN Services
Tenant A
VM VM VM
Tenant B
VM VM VM
Controller
Data Center
Internet
OVS1
OVS2
VPN
..........
DPI Module
VPN Module
Figure 3.2: Policy Conflicts Caused by Different Applications in an SDN-based
Cloud.
In a multi-tenant hosted data center, the provider could have layer-3 rules in
place to prevent certain tenants from sending traffic to one another for monetization,
compliance or regulatory reasons or even due to technical reasons. Hosts in two
different tenant environments, Tenant A and Tenant B, can establish a layer-2 tunnel
(either as a host-to-host tunnel or a site-to-site tunnel) between themselves to do single
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hop communication or to encrypt communication between them as shown in Figure 3.2.
If another application running on the controller inserts policies to implement DPI, all
traffic originating from Tenant A destined to Tenant B will be dropped, since they are
encrypted and fail the DPI standards. Clearly, there is an inherent conflict between
flow rules inserted by different applications running on the SDN controller, leading to
a shoddy user experience.
C. Case Study 3: Load Balancing & IDS
As introduced in Section IV and similar to the scenario in Case Study #2, consider
an SDN-based data center environment where a load balancing application as well as
an IDS application run on the SDN controller. Upon detecting intrusions, the IDS
could implement a countermeasure that offloads traffic from the compromised node.
However, the load balancing application which routes new connections based on their
active load might start redirecting new traffic to the compromised node, since the
system would infer that the compromised node has the least amount of load.
VI. Flow Rule Conflicts
A. Problem Setup
When a packet arrives at an OVS, its match fields are compared to the match
fields of the rules in the flow table. There are multiple ways a rule could be selected,
namely: a) First match, where the first rule that matches the specified fields of the
packet is selected; b) Best match, where the entire firewall rule set is examined to
determine the rule that provides the tightest bounds to the specified fields; c) Deny
take precedence, where any rule with a deny action is automatically preferred over
other actions; and d) Most/Least specific take precedence, where the rule with the
most/least specific match for the match fields [104]. The first match selection is by far
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the most prevalent way to select a matching flow rule. In this dissertation, we assume
all selections to be based on first match selection, with rules ordered by priority. When
multiple rules with the same priority exist, the newest rule has precedence.
B. Conflict Classes
Consider a flow table F containing rule set {r1, r2, ..., rn}. We can represent a flow
rule ri using the tuple (pi, i, ζi, ηi, ρi, ai), where a) pi is the priority. b) i is the frame
space of the rule. c) ζi is the packet space of the rule. d) ηi is the segment space of
the rule. e) ρi is the OSI layer-4 protocol. f) ai is the action set for the rule.
For all devices, including SDN devices or traditional firewalls, we deal with two
main problems:
• Packet Classification Problem: In a firewall with rule set R, for an incoming
packet Πin with address 6-tuple nin and protocol ρin, the packet classification
problem [42], seeks to find out the set Rm ⊆ R where Rm = {ri |( ri ∈ R) ∧ (ni =
nin) ∧ (ρi = ρin)}. The problem can be further extended to determine rule
rx = (px, nx, ρx, ax) ∈ Rm such that px > py ∀ ry ∈ Rm.
• Conflict Detection Problem: The conflict detection problem [42] seeks to find
rules ri, rj such that ri, rj ∈ R and (ni = nj) ∧ (ρi = ρj) ∧ (ai 6= aj ∨ pi 6= pj).
We formally define the set operations on addresses at each OSI layer. Let ξ ∈
{, ζ, η} be a 2-tuple (ξs, ξd) denoting an address at OSI layer-2, layer-3 or layer-4,
with subscript s denoting the source address and d denoting the destination address.
Then the following definitions apply.
Definition 3.6. ξi ⊆ ξj if and only if they refer to the same OSI layer, and ξsi ⊆
ξsj ∧ ξdi ⊆ ξdj.
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Definition 3.7. ξi 6⊆ ξj if and only if they refer to the same OSI layer, and ξsi 6⊆
ξsj ∨ ξdi 6⊆ ξdj.
Definition 3.8. ξi ⊂ ξj if and only if they refer to the same OSI layer, and (ξsi ⊂
ξsj ∧ ξdi ⊆ ξdj) ∨ (ξsi ⊆ ξsj ∧ ξdi ⊂ ξdj).
Definition 3.9. Address Intersection ξi ∩ ξj produces a tuple (ξsi ∩ ξsj, ξdi ∩ ξdj) if
and only if ξi and ξj refer to the same OSI layer.
Definition 3.10. Conflict detection problem [42] seeks to find rules ri, rj such that
ri, rj ∈ R and (ni ∩ nj 6= ∅) ∧ (ρi = ρj) ∧ (ai 6= aj ∨ pi 6= pj).
Definition 3.11. Flow rule address space ni ⊆ nj iff i ⊆ j ∧ ζi ⊆ ζj ∧ ηi ⊆ ηj;
Since flow rules in an SDN-based cloud environment are clearly a super-set of rules
in a traditional firewall environment, work on flow rule conflicts are an extension of
the work on firewall rule conflicts. While several works have classified firewall rule
conflicts [40, 44, 42, 46]; the seminal work by Al-Shaer and Hamed [45] is often used
to classify firewall rule conflicts in a single firewall environment. The classifications
used in the work of Al-Shaer and Hamed [45] are extended to formally classify flow
rule conflicts, and further adapted to suit a distributed environment.
Knowing that OpenFlow specifications clarify that if a packet matches two flow
rules, only the flow rule with the highest priority is invoked, the classification of
different conflicts in SDN environments are detailed in the remainder of this Section.
The conflict classification is visually represented in Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4. Figure 3.3
shows the address space overlap and flow rule conflicts for rules with different priorities,
and Figure 3.4 shows the address space overlap for flow rules with the same priority.
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Figure 3.3: Address Space Overlap and Flow Rule Conflicts for Rules with Different
Priorities.
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1) Redundancy: A rule ri is redundant to rule rj iff: a) address space ni ⊆ nj;
b) protocol ρi = ρj; and c) action ai = aj. For example, consider rules 1 and 2 from
Table 3.1, shown below for easy reference. Rule 2 has an address space that is a subset
to the address space of rule 1, with matching protocol and actions. Hence, rule 2 is
redundant to rule 1. Redundancy does not pose a serious issue, but instead, is more
of an optimization and efficiency problem.
Listing 3.3: Flow Rules with Redundancy Conflict.
<flow_id=1> priority =51, nw_src =10.5.50.0/24 , nw_dst =10.211.1.63 ,
nw_proto=6, actions=output :3
<flow_id=2> priority =50, nw_src =10.5.50.5 , nw_dst =10.211.1.63 ,
nw_proto=6, tp_dst =80, actions=output :3
2) Shadowing: A rule ri is shadowed by rule rj iff: a) priority pi < pj; b) address
space ni ⊆ nj; c) protocol ρi = ρj; and d) action ai 6= aj. In such a situation, rule
ri is never invoked since incoming packets always get processed using rule rj, given
its higher priority. Shadowing is a serious issue since it shows a conflict in a security
policy implementation [45]. For example, rule 4 has the same address space as rule 1,
with the same protocol, but conflicting actions. But, the priority of rule 4 is higher
than that of rule 1, which results in rule 1 never being invoked. Hence, rule 1 is
shadowed by rule 4.
Listing 3.4: Flow Rules with Shadowing Conflict.
<flow_id=1> priority =51, nw_src =10.5.50.0/24 , nw_dst =10.211.1.63 ,
nw_proto=6, actions=output :3
<flow_id=4> priority =53, nw_src =10.5.50.0/24 , nw_dst =10.211.1.63 ,
nw_proto=6, actions=drop
3) Generalization: A rule ri is a generalization of rule rj iff: a) priority pi < pj;
b) address space ni ⊇ nj; and c) action ai 6= aj. In this case, the entire address space
44
of rule rj is matched by rule ri [45]. As shown below, rule 1 is a generalization of rule
5, since the address space of rule 5 is a subset of the address space of rule 1, with
the same protocols, but different actions. Note that if the priorities of the rules are
swapped, it will result in a shadowing conflict. In traditional firewall management
practices, it was common practice to add such rules for administrators to isolate a
smaller portion of the traffic managed separately from a larger set of traffic.
Listing 3.5: Flow Rules with Generalization Conflict.
<flow_id=1> priority =51, nw_src =10.5.50.0/24 , nw_dst =10.211.1.63 ,
nw_proto=6, actions=output :3
<flow_id=5> priority =54, nw_src =10.5.50.0 , nw_dst =10.211.1.63 ,
nw_proto=6, actions=drop
4) Correlation: Classically, a rule ri is correlated to rule rj iff: a) address space
ni 6⊆ nj ∧ ni 6⊇ nj ∧ ni ∩ nj 6= ∅; b) protocol ρi = ρj; and c) action ai 6= aj [45]. As
shown below, rule 3 is correlated to rule 4.
Listing 3.6: Different Priority Flow Rules with Correlation Conflict.
<flow_id=3> priority =52, nw_src =10.5.50.5 , nw_dst =10.211.1.0/24 ,
nw_proto=6, actions=output :2
<flow_id=4> priority =53, nw_src =10.5.50.0/24 , nw_dst =10.211.1.63 ,
nw_proto=6, actions=drop
Since multiple SDN flow rules can have the same priority, we make the following
addition to the correlation conflict to satisfy requirements in an SDN environment: A
rule ri is correlated to rule rj iff: a) priority pi = pj; b) address space ni ∩ nj 6= ∅;
c) protocol ρi = ρj; and d) action ai 6= aj. Thus, the correlation conflict now
encompasses all policies that have the different actions, overlapping address spaces
and the same priority. Scenarios where address spaces of two flow rules are subsets or
supersets, which would have been categorized as generalization and shadowing in a
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traditional environment are classified as a correlation if the priorities of the two flows
are the same. For example, in Table 3.1, rule 6 is correlated to rule 1.
Listing 3.7: Same Priority Flow Rules with Correlation Conflict.
<flow_id=1> priority =51, nw_src =10.5.50.0/24 , nw_dst =10.211.1.63 ,
nw_proto=6, actions=output :3
<flow_id=6> priority =51, nw_src =10.5.50.0/16 , nw_dst =10.211.1.63 ,
nw_proto=6, actions=drop
5) Overlap: A rule ri overlaps rule rj iff: a) address space ni 6⊆ nj ∧ ni 6⊇
nj ∧ ni ∩ nj 6= ∅; b) protocol ρi = ρj; and c) action ai = aj. An overlap rule is similar
to a correlation; but with the same action set. Note that the overlap conflict holds
irrespective of the priority of the rules in question. This overlap can be seen between
rule 6 and rule 7 in Table 3.1, shown below.
Listing 3.8: Flow Rules with Overlap Conflict.
<flow_id=6> priority =51, nw_src =10.5.50.0/16 , nw_dst =10.211.1.63 ,
nw_proto=6, actions=drop
<flow_id=7> priority =55, nw_src =10.5.50.5 , nw_dst =10.211.1.0/24 ,
nw_proto=6, tcp_dst =0x03e8 /0xfff8 , actions=drop
6) Imbrication: The criteria discussed above does not cover all potential conflicts
in SDN environments. Consider the case of flow rules where: a) only layer-3 header
fields are used as a condition (rule 1-7 in Table 3.1); b) only layer-2 header fields
are used as a condition for decision (rule 8); and c) only layer-4 header fields are
used as a condition (rule 9). Even though using our definitions there is no overlap
in address space, and hence there should be no conflict, a packet could match more
than one of these rules. We classify such policy conflicts as imbricates, and address
them by introducing the concept of reconciliation (described in Chapter 6) which
maps all headers to the same layer. Currently, all cross-layer conflicts are classified as
imbrication. They are examined in further detail in Section VI.C.
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C. Cross-layer Policy Conflicts
As opposed to a traditional network, flow rules in SDN, could have matches
on multiple header fields, thereby resulting in indirect dependencies. For example,
consider traffic originating from Host A destined to Host B in Figure 3.5. This flow
would clearly match both the flow rules shown in Listing 3.9. Rule with cookie
value 0x2b0b would match on the layer-2 source, and layer-3 destination address;
while rule with cookie value 0x2b3a would match on the layer-2 source, and layer-2
destination address. Since both the rules have the same priority, the action taken by
the controller would be inconsistent. As mentioned earlier, since there is no direction
in the specification on how to deal with such a scenario, different controllers may deal
with these conflicts in a different manner. A flawed approach to tackle this problem
would be to expand the address space from layer-3 and layer-4 to include layer-2
addresses, and determine rule conflicts as in a traditional environment. However, since
there exists an indirect dependency between the layer-2 and layer-3 addresses, an
apples-to-apples comparison impossible. Moreover, flow rules could exist that do not
specify all the header fields adding another wrinkle.
Further, such conflicts between rules based on addresses over multiple OSI layers
are more complex than the other conflict classifications, since they are transient in
nature. For example, the mapping between a layer-2 MAC address and layer-3 IP
addresses in Figure 3.5 might result in a conflict between two flow rules at time t1 in
the layer-3 address space. But if the IP-MAC address mapping changes, there may not
be an address space overlap between the two rules at time t2. This makes imbrication
conflicts hard to find and even harder to resolve.
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Figure 3.5: Cross-layer Flow Rule Conflict in SDN Environments.
Listing 3.9: Flow Rule Conflict Based on Addresses in Different OSI Layers.
cookie =0x2b0b , duration =926.421s, table=0, n_packets =1378, n_bytes
=271308 , idle_age =77, priority =100 dl_type =0x800 dl_src
=11:11:11:11:11: ab nw_dst =10.211.1.63 actions=NORMAL
cookie =0x2b3a , duration =949.733s, table=0, n_packets =622, n_bytes
=957, idle_age =144, priority =100, dl_type =0x800 dl_src
=11:11:11:11:11: ab dl_dst =11:11: aa:aa :11:21 actions=drop
D. Traffic Engineering Flow Rules
Traffic engineering (TE) generally includes analysis of network traffic to enhance
performance at operational and resource levels [105]. In data center and cloud
service provider environments, QoS and resilience schemes are also considered as
major TE functions, especially since several applications not only have bandwidth
requirements, but also require other QoS guarantees [106]. Given the holistic network
view that the SDN controller possesses, TE mechanisms in SDN can be much more
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efficient and intelligent, when compared to traditional IP-based mechanisms. Research
on SDN based TE has tackled the tradeoffs between latency and load balancing,
focusing on: a) controller load balancing2 [6, 8, 75, 107, 108]; b) switch load balancing
[109, 110, 111, 112, 113]; and c) the use of multiple flow tables. Our focus is determining
how any implementation of TE functions in SDN environments using flow rules might
conflict with security policies. We steer clear of considering controller and switch
load balancing issues dealing with TE, and look at how implementing TE policies
that direct traffic along certain paths, and implementing QoS for certain flows might
interfere with security policy concerning the same flows.
OpenFlow specifications enable packets belonging to certain flows to be directed
to a queue of an egress port. However, using queues to implement QoS requires that
some configuration be done on the switches themselves, in addition to the controller.
The snippet below shows creation of a QoS queue on an OVS that rate limits the
maximum rate of this QoS policy to 1 Mbps, while setting the maximum rate to 5
Mbps.
Listing 3.10: QoS Using Rate Limiting.
$ ovs -vsctl set port eth0 qos=@newqos -- --id=@newqos create qos
type=linux -htb other -config:max -rate =1000000 other -config:max -
rate =5000000
Further QoS related additions in OpenFlow enable the setting of rate limiting
functions. These utilize meter table entries, which define per-flow meters that measure
rate of packets assigned, and enable controlling that rate. Meters are associated
directly with flow entries, as opposed to different queues of egress ports, and contain:
a) an identifier; b) the specified way to process the packet; and c) counters. Use of
the meter table, as shown in Figure 3.6, to establish a game theory based security
2Multiple controller scenarios are discussed in Chapter 4
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framework was demonstrated by Chowdhary et al. [114], wherein the rate sub-field
of band field in meter table was used to establish rate limiting for non-cooperating
actors. Their work shed light on novel ways to use TE to implement security.
Our approach to tackling conflicts while using either of these two QoS scenarios is
abecedarian, wherein only the forward/deny aspect of the rule is considered in the
detection and resolution of conflicts.
Match 
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Priority Counters
Instruction
Set
Meter 
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Band
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Type
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Figure 3.6: Meter Band in OpenFlow Specification.
50
Chapter 4
DISTRIBUTED SDN CONTROLLER CONSIDERATIONS
SDN was designed with a centralized control plane in mind. This empowers
the controller with a complete network-wide view and allows for the development
of control applications and for easier policy enforcement. Centralizing the control
plane in SDN is fraught with scalability challenges associated with the SDN controller
being a bottleneck [4]. Benchmarking tests on an SDN have shown rapid increase
in the performance of a single controller, from about 30, 000 responses per second
using NOX [115] in 2009 to over 1, 350, 000 responses per second for Beacon [108] in
2013. But with data center architectures dealing with 100 GB network traffic (equal
to about 130 Million Packets Per Second (MPPS) [116]), a single controller would
still not scale well enough to be deployed in a cloud environment [5]. Further, large
production environments still demand performance and availability [77]. Distributing
the controller responsibilities to multiple devices/applications, while maintaining
logical centralization is an obvious solution. Figure 4.1 shows a representation of
major different distributed controller categories; namely clustered and hierarchical.
While the OpenFlow protocol supports multiple controller environments, the
controllers themselves need to be able to: a) allow a switch to establish communication
with them; and b) have mechanisms in place to process handover, fail overs, etc.
OpenFlow shields itself from the complexities of a multiple controller environment,
and just requires the controller to have one of three roles - OFPCR_ROLE_MASTER,
OFPCR_ROLE_EQUAL or OFPCR_ROLE_SLAVE1.
1The Master and Slave roles are self-explanatory. Equal role and Master role are exactly the
same, with the difference that only one controller can be Master at a time, while multiple controllers
can share the Equal role.
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Clustered Hierarchial
Figure 4.1: Distributed Controller Classes.
Moving to a distributed controller environment essentially splits the roles of the
SDN controller between multiple devices that communicate with the switches, and a
data store that retains complete environment knowledge.
I. Challenges in Multiple-Controller Domain
Several studies have attempted to study distributed SDN controllers (see Chapter 2,
Section IV). However, despite their attempt at distributing the control plane, they
require a consistent network wide view in all the controllers. Maintaining synchroniza-
tion and concurrency in a highly dynamic cloud environment is problematic. Since
the SDN switches look to the controllers for answers while handling unfamiliar flows,
knowing which controller to ask is important. Moreover, the controllers themselves
need to have methodologies to decide who controls which switch, and who reacts to
which events. And most of all, consistency in the security policies present on the con-
troller is paramount - the absence of which might result in attackers using application
hopping across multiple partitions of the SDN environment without permissions.
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Since one of the primary motivations behind SDN was a centralized control plane
that has complete knowledge of the environment, maintaining a complete picture after
dividing the network into multiple sub-networks requires information aggregation.
This could be challenging, especially when the environments are dynamic.
While designing a distributed controller architecture, the implications of controller
placement needs to be considered carefully. For example, security policies in a mesh
controller architecture would have to ensure minimal address space overlap; while in a
hierarchical architecture, it may be acceptable for the lower level (leaf) controllers
to share address spaces. In environments where latency is a concern, the distance
between controllers and the switches needs to be minimized.
Finally, studies also suggest that distributed control planes are not adaptable to
heterogeneous and constrained network deployments [76]. This removes a certain
amount of desired design flexibility from the SDN setup.
II. Controller Decentralization Model
Choosing a decentralized control architecture is not trivial. There are several
controller placement solutions, and factors such as the number of controllers, their
location, and topology impact network performance [117]. Three major issues need to
be elucidated [118] while determining the decentralization architecture:
• Efficient east and westbound APIs need to be developed for communication
between SDN controllers.
• The latency increase introduced due to network information exchange between
the controllers need to be kept to a minimum.
• The size and operation of the controller back-end database needs to be evaluated.
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Since the key piece of information required for accurate flow rule conflict detection
(and resolution, as will be described in Chapter 5) is the priority value of the flow rule
p, the key challenge in extending flow rule conflict resolution from a single controller
to a distributed SDN-based cloud environment lies in associating global priority values
to flow rules. Definition 4.1 defines global priority.
Definition 4.1. A global priority p′ of a rule ri is value in the range [1, 65535], as
determined by weighing the priority value p by the rule origination point’s position
in the global distribution scheme. Alternately, p′ could be obtained using a static
mapping scheme from p.
To illustrate Definition 4.1, consider flow rule as shown with a priority value of 51.
If this flow rule originated in a controller or application with a weight of 2, its global
priority would be 102.
Listing 4.1: Global Priority Determination.
priority =51, nw_src =10.5.50.5 , nw_dst =10.211.1.1 , actions=output :3
global_priority =102, priority =51, nw_src =10.5.50.5 , nw_dst
=10.211.1.1 , actions=output :3
The strategies to associate these global priority numbers to flow rules in different
decentralization scenarios differ drastically. We classify five different multiple controller
scenarios, and the global priority assignment logic followed by our framework for each
of them.
A. Clustered Controllers
The clustered SDN controller is the simplest of the multiple controller environments.
It is ideal for smaller networks, where one controller can process all events and run all
applications. Clustering adds a layer of defense against the controller being a single
point of failure by having one or more controllers in an active/standby scenario. Since
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all the controllers run the same applications and communicate with all the data plane
devices, the global priority assigned to the rules would be equal to the priority of the
rule.
Flow rule conflict classification and resolution in clustered controllers is handled
exactly like in a single controller environment, owing to a lack of partitioning of
data plane devices or applications. Hence, discussion of clustered controllers as a
decentralization strategy is limited in the rest of this dissertation.
B. Host-based Partitioning
Host-based partitioning is most like a traditional layered network architecture,
where an SDN controller handles the functionalities of an access layer switch, combined
with the intelligence of a router and access control server. The SDN-based cloud
environment is separated into domains, where each domain is controlled by a single
controller. As shown in Figure 4.2, the tenant infrastructure in multi-tenant data
center environment could be considered a domain that is handled by one controller.
All the controllers present in the environment would maintain global knowledge of the
environment by communicating with each other using east-west communication APIs.
Running on the assumption that the controller knows best about the main it is
responsible for, flow rules which contain match conditions with addresses local to
the controller are preferred. For example, the rule with cookie value 0xa added onto
Controller 1 permits DNS traffic into host 10.211.1.5, which we assume, is an address
assigned to Tenant A. If the rule with cookie value 0xb is added on Controller 2, the
two conflicting flow rules will be known to all the controllers owing to the controllers
sharing their information.
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Figure 4.2: Host-based Partitioning.
Listing 4.2: Conflicting Flow Rules in Host-based Partitioning.
cookie =0xa, priority =100, nw_dst =10.211.1.5 , nw_proto =17, udp_dst
=53, actions=output :1
cookie =0xb, priority =100, nw_dst =10.0.0.0/8 , nw_proto =17, udp_dst
=53, actions=drop
To help select the rule most applicable to the tenant, we assign weights to the flow
rules such that the ones originating from the controller assigned to the specific domain
(Controller 1, in our example) is considerably higher. The weight itself is dependent
on the environment, and can be assigned by an administrator. Assuming a weight of
10 for the local controller, we now have global priorities as shown in the modified flow
rules below. The global priority value can then be used for conflict resolution.
Listing 4.3: Assigning Global Priority in Host-based Partitioning.
global_priority =1000 , cookie =0xa, priority =100, nw_dst =10.211.1.5 ,
nw_proto =17, udp_dst =53, actions=output :1
global_priority =100, cookie =0xb, priority =100, nw_dst =10.0.0.0/8 ,
nw_proto =17, udp_dst =53, actions=drop
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Host-based partitioning is popular in several cloud deployments, owing to its
simplicity. In DragonFlow [119], for example, an instance of the controller runs on
every compute node in the OpenStack [38] cloud. Partitioning in DragonFlow is based
on the node it runs on, and not purely tenant-based. Thus, an instance of DragonFlow
would manage the OVS and flow rules that are associated with hosts running on
the same compute node. The different DragonFlow instances in the cloud share
information by communicating with a shared back-end database. Partitioning schemes
such as those employed by DragonFlow are intuitive and most like decentralization
strategies used in traditional environments.
C. Hierarchical Controllers
Hierarchical controller distribution is a variant of host-based partitioning, where
some controllers handle a subset of data plane devices, while others only communicate
with control plane devices. The controllers that communicate with the data plane
devices can be thought of as leaf-level controllers, while higher-level controllers com-
municate solely with other controllers. Figure 4.3 shows a hierarchical distribution of
controllers. Further, the partitioning may not be strictly host-based, as administrators
could decide to run certain applications on leaf-level controllers, and other applications
on higher-level controllers. For example, a DHCP application could reside on the leaf
controller while a NAT application could reside on the root controller.
Since higher-level controllers do not communicate with data plane devices, except
in cases when leaf-level controllers fail, control channel communication is streamlined.
Leaf-level nodes can obtain global information by communicating with the higher-level
controller, eliminating the need to talk with every other leaf controller. Since the root
controller would have holistic knowledge of the environment, in case of conflicts flow
rules originating from the root controller are preferred.
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Figure 4.3: Hierarchical Controller Distribution.
Revisiting the example from host-based partitioning scheme, consider that the rule
with cookie value 0xa added onto Controller 1, while the rule with cookie value 0xb is
added on Controller 0. While Controller 1 might still permit DNS traffic into the host
at IP 10.211.1.5, the root level controller might have an IDS application running on it
that detected a DDoS attack, and dropped all DNS traffic to the devices on 10.0.0.0/8
subnet. Once again, we use a weight of 10, but this time for the rule on Controller 0,
thereby ensuring the conflict resolution algorithm drops the attack traffic.
Listing 4.4: Assigning Global Priority in Hierarchical Partitioning.
global_priority =100, cookie =0xa, priority =100, nw_dst =10.211.1.5 ,
nw_proto =17, udp_dst =53, actions=output :1
global_priority =1000 , cookie =0xb, priority =100, nw_dst =10.0.0.0/8 ,
nw_proto =17, udp_dst =53, actions=drop
Hierarchical controllers may also be used if there is a specific structure to the
network, such as a two-tier structure. In such situations, hierarchy at the controller
level can help to manage flows for different tiers in the network. However, coordination
needs to be addressed to ensure efficiency in flow management.
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D. Application-based Partitioning
Application-based partitioning, as shown in Figure 4.4 implements decentralization
by having different applications run on different instances of the controller. As with
host-based partitioning, the flow rules generated by the different applications would
be known to the other controllers using the east-west communication APIs. Each
data plane device in this scenario would communicate with every controller in the
environment.
Data Plane
Controller 1
Controller 2
Controller n
App 1
App 2
App n
Figure 4.4: Application-based Controller Decentralization.
Associating global priority values in application-based decentralization is straight-
forward. It could be done by assigning a weight to each application [11] using which
the global priorities of flow rules generated by all applications can be determined. For
example, consider Controller 1 with security applications running on it, and Controller
2 with QoS and traffic shaping applications running on it. If security applications are
prioritized with a higher weight than traffic shaping applications, flow rules with the
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same priority generated by applications on Controller 1 and Controller 2 will end up
with the rule generated by Controller 1 having a higher global priority.
An alternate strategy to assign global priority values would be to allocate ranges
for flow rules created by applications. For example, it could be decided that any NAT
rule generated by the NAT application on the controller must be within a priority
of 40, 000 and 42, 000. Thus a global priority for a NAT rule would be generated by
mapping the priority originally in the range [1, 65535] to a global priority in the range
[40000, 42000].
E. Heterogeneous Partitioning
In a heterogeneous decentralized environment, appealing aspects of each of the
above decentralization scenarios are combined to obtain the optimal situation for
meeting the requirements. Careful consideration needs to be taken to identify the
priorities of applications and controllers before deployment, to have a conflict resolution
strategy.
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Chapter 5
FLOW RULE CONFLICT RESOLUTION
In this Chapter, the considerations for flow rule conflict resolution are discussed.
First, the flow rule conflict types discussed in Chapter 3 are categorized based on
their difficulty of resolution. A conflict resolution model that addresses automatic
resolution of the flow rule conflicts are presented next.
I. Conflict Severity Classification
Based on their potential for causing damage, as well as their difficulty to resolve,
the flow rule conflicts formalized above can be classified into the following tiers:
A. Tier-1 Conflicts
Imbrication conflicts stem from flow rules using addresses in multiple layers. Since
mapping between different layers is of transient nature in dynamic SDN environments,
these conflicts are transient as well. Any resolution technique used to resolve these
conflicts is, at best, made taking the current system state into account. Such a
resolution might induce the system to be in a highly compromisable state at a future
time, which could be exploited by attackers. To illustrate, consider once again, the
topology in Figure 3.5. If a layer-2 policy and a layer-3 policy that constrains traffic
between hosts A and D are present, one of the conflict resolution strategies might
select the layer-2 flow rule. However, if the mapping between the layer-2 and layer-3
addresses change, the conflict resolution decision might be rendered invalid.
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B. Tier-2 Conflicts
Conflicts classified as generalization and correlation stem from overlapping address
spaces and incompatible actions. These conflicts stem from attempts at combining
and oversimplifying flow rules. By making the address spaces used in the flow rules as
fine-grained as possible, tier-2 conflicts can be eliminated.
C. Tier-3 Conflicts
Conflicts categorized as redundancy and overlap result from rules with overlapping
address spaces but the same resulting action. The shadowing conflict stems from rules
which are never invoked. In case of redundancy and overlap, the action remains the
same, so choosing any either flow rule would result in the same action on the packet.
Shadowed rules are never invoked owing to their lower priority. Thus, we content
that while it is not ideal that these conflicts exist in the system, their presence in the
system is not a security threat but an optimization issue.
II. Conflict Resolution Model
The different flow rule conflicts can be broadly categorized into Intelligible and
Interpretative conflicts. The resolution strategies for each of these two categories
are markedly different, and are detailed in the remainder of this Section. Tier-1 and
Tier-2 conflicts are interpretative in nature, while Tier-3 conflicts are intelligible in
nature.
A. Intelligible Conflicts
Flow rules that conflict with each other in the Redundancy and Overlap classifica-
tions all have the same action they can be resolved without the loss of any information.
Rules that have shadowing conflicts can simply be removed, without affecting any
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packet. In other words, the resolution algorithm can guarantee that any packet that is
permitted by the controller prior to resolving the conflict will continue to be permitted
after conflict resolution. And similarly, any packet that is being blocked prior to
conflict resolution will continue to be blocked after the conflict resolution is put in
place. Intelligible conflicts are resolved easily by eliminating the rules that are not
applied, or by combining and optimizing the address spaces in the rules to avoid the
conflict [120].
It could be argued that creative design of rules by administrators result in flow
rules that deliberately conflict to optimize the number of rules in the flow table,
especially when it comes to traffic shaping policies. However, such optimization
strategies stem out of legacy network management techniques, and do not hold true
in dynamic, large-scale cloud environments where the flow table enforcing the policies
in the environment could have millions of rules.
B. Interpretative Conflicts
Conflicts that fall into Generalization, Correlation and Imbrication classification
cannot be intuitively resolved without any loss of information, and are interpretative
in nature. As opposed to intelligible conflicts, it is not guaranteed that any packet
permitted by the controller prior to resolving the conflict will be permitted after
conflict resolution. Since interpretative conflict resolution is lossy in nature, the
resolution strategies are not a one size fits all and need to be adapted per the cloud
environment in question. Removing these conflicts is a complex problem [121].
A few different resolution strategies that could be applied to resolving these conflicts
are discussed below. The global priority of the rule is assigned depending on the
controller decentralization strategy discussed in Chapter 4. Resolution strategies for
Tier-1 conflicts are shaky at best. Since these conflicts are transient in nature, an
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additional decision needs to be made as to the time duration for which the conflict
resolution strategy is valid. We look at four different strategies.
1) Least Privilege: In case of any conflict, flow rules that have a deny action are
prioritized over a QoS or a forward action. If conflicts exist between a higher and
lower bandwidth QoS policy, the lower QoS policy is enforced. The least privilege
strategy is traditionally the most popular strategy in conflict resolution [122].
2) Module Security Precedence: Since flow rules in an SDN-based cloud environment
can be generated by any number of modules that run on the controller, an effective
strategy that can be put in place is to have a security precedence for the origin of the
flow rule [11]. Thus, a flow rule originating from a security module is prioritized over
flow rule from an application or optimization module. The weighted global priorities
are calculated as discussed in the application-based partitioning scheme discussed
in Chapter 4, Section II. Table 5.1 shows sample precedence and associated global
priority weight values for a few generic applications that might run in an SDN-based
cloud.
Application Precedence Global Priority Weight
Virtual Private Network 1 3
Deep Packet Inspection 2 2.5
Network Address Translation 3 2
Quality of Service 4 1.5
Domain Name Service 5 1
Table 5.1: Security Precedence Priority Multiplier Example.
3) Environment Calibrated: This strategy incorporates learning strategies in the
environment to make an educated decision on which conflicting flow rule really needs
64
to be prioritized. Over time, if a picture can be formed about the type of data
that a certain tenant in a multi-tenant data center usually creates/retrieves, or of
the applications and vulnerabilities that exist in the tenant environment, or of the
reliability of the software modules inserting the flow rule; the conflict resolution module
may be able to prioritize certain flow rules over others. However, these techniques
falter while dealing with a dynamic cloud.
A more deliberate approach might involve quantitative security analysis of the
environment with each of the conflicting rules, and picking the safest option. Metrics
originally proposed by Joh and Malaiya [123] and validated by Lippmann et al.
[124] provide a quantitative measurement of the probability of the Cyber Key Terrain
(CKT) [125] being compromised. Interpretative conflict resolution could be as simple as
determining which of the conflicting policies would reduce the compromise probability.
4) Administrator Assistance: Administrators that are willing to give up automatic
conflict resolution have the option to resolve conflicts manually, so they can judge
each conflict independently. Visual assistance tools incorporated as part of the Brew
framework assist the administrator make a decision, and are detailed in [126].
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Chapter 6
BREW: A SECURITY POLICY MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK IN
DISTRIBUTED SDN ENVIRONMENTS
In this chapter, a system overview, architecture detail for the Brew security policy
management framework is provided. In addition, implementation details for the
framework on an OpenDaylight (ODL) SDN controller is furnished.
I. System Overview & Models
This section describes the design requirements, assumptions, operating environment
as well the security model for Brew.
A. Design Requirements & Assumptions
Brew satisfies the following design requirements:
• The flow rule set that is generated as output should be without any conflicts.
This includes the need to detect conflicts in a security implementation, both
intra-flow table and inter-flow table, and resolve conflicts that might result due
to changing security requirements.
• Cross-path policy discrepancy must be addressed: Policy consistency across all
possible paths between the source (external or internal) and the destination is
required, thereby ensuring that no matter what route is taken by a packet, the
same security rules apply.
• A highly desirable feature is automation, since the human element is more likely
to introduce error. Ideally, human intervention should be required only in case
of zero-day type situations where an intelligent decision needs to be made.
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• Implementation should include a mechanism to safely distribute the security
policies to all implementation points.
• The implementation should be able to adapt to a dynamic network topology
and real-time updates, without compromising the overall security policy of the
enterprise or operation. This requirement is especially important as one of the
motivating goals behind SDN was being able to modify a network topology as
demanded by the conditions.
Two major assumptions are made during implementation and testing of the
framework, both pertaining to administrator trust:
• The administrator workstation is secure and uncompromised. No rogue agent is
present on the workstation that can poison the flow tables. This implicit trust
placed on the administrator masks potential issues that might arise in when the
conflict resolution strategy looks to the administrator for resolution.
• The administrator has a global view of the environment and acts in good faith
to resolve conflicts between conflicting tenants.
B. Operating Environment
The environment is any data network installation based on SDN principles, such
as an IaaS cloud. In an IaaS cloud, VMs are managed by tenants. Changing business
needs, changing security concerns or simply implementing new applications may result
in new policies that must be implemented on packets traversing the network. When
new policies are applied, it is necessary to check and resolve conflicts with existing
rules as well as enterprise security policies and business SLAs.
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C. Security Model
Brew seeks to alleviate concerns regarding security policy conflicts in SDN envi-
ronments. However, security challenges that are not addressed in Brew include:
• The southbound interface between the controller and switches are vulnerable
to threats that could degrade the availability, performance and integrity of the
network.
• Attacks that consume controller resources would impact the conflict detection
and resolution algorithms, which run on the controller.
• Verification of flow rule generating applications is not done. It is assumed that
verified applications are generating candidate flow rules.
II. System Architecture
A. System Modules
The Brew framework uses an intuitive model to help resolve conflicts in flow rules
in a distributed SDN-based cloud environment. Brew runs as an application on the
controller, consisting of two inter-related modules, the OFAnalyzer and OFProcessor,
that together achieve conflict free flow tables. Both modules operate at the control
plane level, i.e., their operations are uninhibited by either the physical topology
or the logical topology as seen by the different tenants. The OFAnalyzer font-end
has two sub-processes - Flow extraction engine, and a visualization engine. The
OFProcessor back-end has three sub-processes - flow prepping, conflict detection
and conflict resolution. Figure 6.1 shows the flow of control and logic between these
sub-processes.
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Figure 6.1: Flow of Control and Logic Between Brew Sub-Processes.
The OFAnalyzer module serves as the font-end of Brew, with a listening engine for
new/modified flow rules being introduced into the system as well as flow rules that
are being removed. A visualization engine serves the processed conflict data back to
the administrator. In the automatic resolution mode, the visualization engine serves
the conflict resolution details to the administrator.
The OFProcessor is responsible for the back-end processing in Brew. The processing
is broadly compartmentalized into prepping, conflict detection and conflict resolution.
The modules that accomplish these tasks are detailed in the remainder of this section.
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B. OFAnalyzer Module
The OFAnalyzer module acts as the interface between the SDN controller and the
OFProcessor back-end. It performs two important tasks: a) flow extraction; and
b) visualization.
1) Flow Extraction Engine: The flow extraction engine intercepts any new or
updated flow rule that is being injected into the controller from different modules.
These rules, called candidate flow rules, are defined in Definition 6.1. In a distributed
controller scenario, candidate flow rules into every controller are obtained to have
complete knowledge of all possible flow rules that are present in the environment.
These rules are then aggregated for purposes of processing. In addition, the flow
extraction engine does a periodic pull of all the flow rules present on the data switches
to ensure it has complete knowledge of all the flow rules present in the environment.
Definition 6.1. A candidate flow rule is a flow rule that an application or an
administrator wants to insert into the flow table. It has not been completely processed
and vetted, and hence is not eligible to be sent to any of the switches. A flow removal
attempt would also be considered as a candidate flow rule before it has been processed.
Next, the global priority of candidate flow rules are computed by weighing the
priority of the rule based on the decentralization strategy that has been employed as
discussed in Chapter 4. Thus, the priority assigned by the flow extraction engine may
differ from the priority of the flow rule present in the flow table.
The default OpenFlow rule specifications do not provide us all the information
needed to detect and resolve flow rule conflicts. Thus, a data structure with four
additional fields is added to each flow rule. These 24 bits of information shown in
Figure 6.2, are: a) One bit identifying if the rule in question has been tagged as a
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reconciled rule (required for imbrication detection); b) seven bits identifying the SDN
controller to which the rule is going to be inserted; and c) sixteen bits for a global
priority of the flow rule (to be used for flow rule conflict resolution).
Armed with these additional bits of information, detection and resolution of
conflicts between the candidate flow rule and flow rules currently present in the flow
table is now possible. Control is handed off to the flow prepping engine.
Reconciled?
Origin 
Controller
Global 
Priority
OpenFlow Match Fields + Actions
1 bit
7 bits
16 bits
Figure 6.2: Data Structure Format.
2) Visualization Engine: The visualization engine in Brew is a module under the
DLUX UI [127] that performs a REST Request to obtain the flow rules present in
the environment, along with the conflict information from the OFProcessor in JSON
format. JavaScript conversion routines aggregate and transform this information using
various visualization techniques.
In an automatic conflict resolution mode, no conflicts would be available to be
presented in the GUI. In such scenarios, the Visualization engine could be repurposed
to store and present resolved conflicts in a time bounded manner.
C. OFProcessor Module
The OFProcessor module handles the back-end logic of Brew. Its functionalities
are compartmentalized as flow rule prepping, conflict detection and conflict resolution.
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The candidate flow rules are atomized and the reconciled bit in the data structure
shown in Figure 6.2 is determined. Conflict detection and conflict resolution strategies
follow the discussion in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5.
1) Flow Prepping Engine: Since OpenFlow permits chained flow rules by having
an action for a match redirect to a different flow table, to correctly identify conflicts
between flow rules, flow rules are atomized by processing the chains and ensuring that
only the atomic actions of forward and drop remain. The atomization process itself
follows along the lines of ipchain processing in Unix with modifications based on the
formal model described in Chapter 3. Since QoS and packet counters can be processed
along with the forward and drop actions, flow rules with QoS and traffic engineering
actions are mapped to the forward action. There are two important considerations
made here:
• While the actions for a flow rule can include any drop, forward, flood, set QoS
parameters, change several header fields, or redirect to a different flow table, we
process the actions and generically classify them into two categories; forward
and drop. For example, implementing an IP mapping rule in OpenFlow would
change the IP address headers and forward onto a different flow table that
forwards the traffic. Such a chain is processed to include the address translation
information and the final atomic action of the flow rule is set to forward.
• For rules which have multiple actions, the rules are duplicated to generate rules
with identical priority and match conditions with a single action.
Flow rules which have only layer-2 addresses as its match conditions are next
mapped to their layer-3 addresses using a process called reconciliation. A transient
1-to-1 mapping between the layer-2 and layer-3 addresses is obtained by doing an
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ARP table lookup. The layer-3 addresses are then populated in the corresponding
address fields in the flow rule. In cases where a mapping is not found, the layer-3
address fields is left unpopulated. Rules that have only layer-4 match conditions are
also processed in a similar manner.
2) Conflict Detection Engine: As the name suggests, this process is responsible for
detecting any conflicts that might exist between the prepped candidate flow rule set,
and the rules that currently populate the flow rule table. In addition to identifying
the conflict, it also classifies conflicts based on the categories described in Chapter 3.
Determining the existence of address space overlap between flow rules is the first
step in deciding if a conflict exists between two flow rules. The address space overlap
is detected using a Patricia trie lookup [128] based algorithm. The Patricia trie itself
has been employed for routing table lookups within the BSD kernel since the 4.3 Reno
release, and has been used previously with great success [71, 129] owing to it being
an efficient search structure for finding IP string matches [130] with a good balance
between running time (lookup and update) and memory space requirement. An octet
wise Patricia trie lookup is conducted to look for IP address range overlap between
the new rules being inserted and existing rules in the flow table in a fast and efficient
manner. Once an address space overlap is determined, evaluating if a conflict exists
between the flow rules can be accomplished in constant time using simple comparison
operations.
3) Conflict Resolution Engine: Once the flow rule conflicts have been detected, the
conflict resolution module is invoked. Intelligible conflicts are resolved automatically.
In case of interpretative conflicts which cannot be resolved without loss of information,
the administrators can decide the resolution strategy (discussed in Chapter 5), which
then employs the global priority value to resolve conflicts.
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III. Implementation
Brew was implemented on an OpenDaylight (ODL) [131] SDN controller. Sec-
tion III.A describes the ODL controller with information pertinent to Brew. By
modularizing the functionality of Brew into the front-end OFAnalyzer interface (cus-
tomized to ODL), and a back-end OFProcessor, as shown in Figure 6.3, flexibility
to have the same OFProcessor back-end work with different SDN controller specific
OFAnalyzer interfaces in the future is maintained.
OFProcessor
ODL Controller
OVS 1
Flow Table ...
OVS n
Flow Table
...
OFAnalyzer
Java DTO
OpenFlow
Brew
Conflict 
Detection
Conflict 
Resolution
Flow Prepping
Flow 
Extraction
Patricia 
Trie
Visualization
HashMap
JSON
Figure 6.3: System Overview Representing Different Brew Modules.
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Prior to examining the implementation of each sub-process in detail, it is important
to have a basic understanding of the ODL controller, and associated tools.
A. OpenDaylight (ODL)
ODL is an open-source project under the Linux Foundation [132]. Applications
running on the ODL controller use a Service Abstraction Layer (SAL) to communicate
with different types of devices using a variety of communication protocols, and provide
RESTful APIs for use by external applications. ODL was chosen as the controller
in this implementation because of its large open-source development community, as
well as indications during decision making that ODL would be adopted as an industry
standard. This work extends the stable Lithium version of the controller. Figure 6.4
shows the ODL architecture including the different modules.
DLUX
AAA-AuthN Filter
OpenDaylight APIs (REST)
Service Abstract Layer (SAL)
(Plugin Manager, Capability Abstraction, Flow Programming, Inventory, etc.)
OpenFlow OVSDB
...
NETCONF...
Orchestration 
Layer
Controller
Controller
Data plane 
Elements
Basic network functions + Loadable modules
Figure 6.4: ODL Architecture.
The ODL project repository, available at [133] follows a microservices architecture
to control applications, protocols, plugins and interfaces between providers and cus-
tomers. It uses YANG data structures along with shared data stores and messaging
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infrastructure to implement a Model Driven SAL (MD-SAL) approach to solving more
complex problems. This model helps keep the controller as lightweight as possible,
providing users with the ability to install protocols and services as needed. As of
this dissertation, the ODL ecosystem has implementations for Switching, Routing,
Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA), a DLUX based Graphical User
Interface (GUI) and support for protocols such as OpenFlow, NETCONF, BGP/P-
CEP, SNMP, CAPWAP. Additionally, it interfaces with OpenStack [38] and OVS
through the OVSDB Integration Project [134]. This modularization and separation of
functionality has been implemented per the Open Services Gateway Initiative (OSGi)
specification, and as such provides for service object initiation, dynamic module
handling and graceful exit.
MD-SAL
Application 
YANG model
Application 
Model data
Controller 
Model
REST API
OpenFlow
A
p
p
lic
a
tio
n
s
Figure 6.5: MD-SAL Application Development.
ODL uses Apache Karaf [135] as its OSGi container. Applications1 in Karaf are
independent of each other, and can be started, stopped or restarted without affect-
1Interchangeably called bundles or features. Karaf command line uses the keyword feature
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ing other applications. Brew uses the l2switch, openflowplugin, openflowjava,
yangtools, netconf and dlux features. RESTCONF [136] provides a RESTful API
to perform Create, Retrieve, Update and Delete (CRUD) operations using NETCONF,
which itself is a means to configure network elements in a vendor agnostic manner
using the YANG modeling language. Figure 6.5 shows the relationship between the
different protocols and modeling languages in a MD-SAL development paradigm [126].
A new application development requires defining the application’s model using YANG.
ODL maintains two different data stores, as shown in Figure 6.6. Classified
broadly on the type of data maintained in them, they are: a) configuration data
store; and b) operational data store. Since the data is stored in a tree format, the
configuration and operational data stores are interchangeably called the configuration
and operational trees.
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Figure 6.6: ODL Data Stores.
The configuration data store on each ODL controller contains data that describes
the changes to be made to the flow rules on the switches. It represents the intended
state of the system, and is populated by administrators, or applications on the
controller. The configuration data store contains information about every device
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present in the environment, flow tables associated with the devices, and the flow
rules in every flow table. To give administrators and other applications the ability to
populate this data store, it has read/write permission. The operational data store
matches the configuration data store in structure, but contains information that the
controller discovers about the network through periodic queries. It represents the
state of the system as understood by the data plane components in the environment.
As opposed to the configuration data store, the operational data store has read-only
permissions. The use of dual data stores is primarily to maintain global knowledge
of the environment while supporting a multiple controller scenario. For example, if
Controller 1 has a new flow rule that is used by an OVS to direct traffic, Controller
2 would learn of this flow rule when it populates its operational data store with all
the flow rules present in the environment. This would happen irrespective of the
communication between the two controllers.
B. Flow Extraction Engine
ODL provides RESTful APIs to add to, remove from, and update flows in the
configuration data store, and to view the operational data store. These APIs can be
accessed by the administrator through a Web UI, CLI, or other RESTful clients like
POSTMAN [137], and by other applications running on the controller through the
same APIs. The flow rules are then sent to the switches using the OpenFlow protocol.
Brew modifies the native behavior of ODL. It listens for potential changes being
piped into the system using the RESTful APIs, and processes them. Natively, appli-
cations running on the controller attempt to add flows using the RESTful APIs for
the controller. When the flow is successfully added to the configuration data store on
the controller, a dataChanged notification is issued to the Flow Programmer service.
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The flow extraction engine in Brew defines an object pointing to the Flow.class
under opendaylight-flow-types.yang model in ODL. This object is used to register
as a listener in the DataBrokerService Document Object Model (DOM) tree, which
enables the object to learn about changes to the configuration data store when the
onDataChanged function from the Flow Programmer Service returns true. The required
data is received using a Java Data Transfer Object (DTO). The flows extracted are
structured as shown in Listing 6.1 using Algorithm 1, and stored in a local HashMap.
Listing 6.1: Extracted Flow Rule Structure.
grouping flow {
container match {
uses match:match;
}
container instructions {
uses instruction -list;
}
<snip >
}
}
grouping match {
<snip >
container "ethernet -match" {
uses "ethernet -match -fields ";
}
container "ip-match" {
uses "ip -match -fields ";
}
choice layer -3-match {
case "ipv4 -match" {
uses "ipv4 -match -fields ";
}
case "ipv4 -match -arbitrary -bit -mask"{
uses "mask:ipv4 -match -arbitrary -bitmask -fields ";
}
case "arp -match" {
uses "arp -match -fields ";
}
case "tunnel -ipv4 -match" {
uses "tunnel -ipv4 -match -fields ";
}
}
<snip >
}
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The flow extraction engine extracts flow rules from both the configuration and
operational data stores maintained by ODL. As discussed in Section III.A, since
flow rules sent by all applications reside in configuration data store before they are
sent to the devices, and the flow rules existing in the environment are present in
the operational data store, listening to flow rules from both data stores helps the
OFAnalyzer maintain a complete view of the flow rules present in the environment,
especially in a distributed controller scenario. The source controller of the rules is
noted so as to eliminate duplication. In addition, the flow extraction engine also
listens for candidate flow rules from different applications running on the controllers,
and stores them in the HashMap.
Once the flows have been extracted, each flow is given a unique identifier, making
it easier to track the flow when analyzing conflicts, and for visualization purposes.
The HashMap is then passed to the OFProcessor. This process is repeated for every
controller present in the system.
In Algorithm 1, if the DTO contains elements of a candidate flow, its header fields
are extracted. In addition, new fields of the data structure shown in Figure 6.2 is
added to the flow rule fields. If the flow rule is configured using only layer-2 headers
or layer-4 headers, then it is marked as being reconciled. This tag is then used in the
conflict detection engine for determining the imbrication conflict.
C. Flow Prepping Engine
When the instruction set of a flow entry does not contain a redirection to another
flow table, OpenFlow pipeline processing stops and the actions in the action set
are executed. The actions are applied in the pre-determined order, per OpenFlow
specifications [86] as follows: a) copy TTL inwards; b) pop all tags on the packet;
c) push-MPLS tag onto the packet; d) push-PBB tag onto the packet; e) push-VLAN
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Algorithm 1: Flow Extraction Engine
Input :Rule c, Controller C, Strategy s
Output : procRule r
Procedure FlowExtract()
1 r ← c
2 if c.l3match == ∅ then
3 if !c.l2match == ∅ then
4 r.reconciled← TRUE
5 r.origController ← C
6 r.globalPriority ← getGlobalPriority(r.priority, C, s)
7 return r
tag onto the packet; f) copy TTL outwards; g) decrement TTL; h) apply all set-field
actions to the packet; i) apply QoS actions; j) apply group actions; and k) forward
the packet on the specified port. Trivially, anytime the final action is a deny, the
remainder of the tags do not matter. However, an action set can only contains a
maximum of one action of each type, unless defined as an Apply-Actions instruction.
Unlike the action set, the actions of an Apply-Actions list are executed in the order
specified by the list, and are applied immediately to the packet.
The flow prepping engine is primarily responsible for converting the candidate
flow rule hashmap into a format that the flow rule conflict detection module expects.
Knowing the processing preference of an OpenFLow action set, in the ODL based
implementation the flow prepping engine atomizes the flow rule action sets, and stores
the flow rule match address into a Patricia trie data structure.
Flow rule atomization involves the following steps:
• If a flow rule has an Apply-Actions list, then traverse the entire flow table
pipeline and append to the actions set. If the flow rule uses a simple action set,
then the complete chain of actions is compiled by processing the entire pipeline.
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• Once the complete set of actions for a flow rule is determined, a duplicate flow
rule with identical priority is created for each action, such that all rules have
only one action.
• The flow rule actions, are next converted to one of two terminal actions - deny
and forward. All actions aside from an explicit deny are considered to be a
forward action, albeit with potentially modified header values.
Next, the address used in layer-3 match for each of the flow rules are stored in a
Patricia trie data structure. Each edge in the Patricia trie is labeled with a bit, with
each leaf node corresponding to the stored string. This string would be a concatenation
of bits on a path from the root to this node. The trie provides storage and processing
efficiency in due to its ability to collapse chains of nodes that have only one child
simply by indicating how many bits should be skipped (i.e., what the length of the
collapsed chain is). Each source and destination layer-3 address is stored into an octet
wise Patricia trie. Thus each flow rule will have eight different tries associated with it2.
To preserve semantic information, the leaf nodes in the Patricia trie store the unique
identifier for every flow rule that has a match for that specific octet. Figure 6.7 shows
the data structure being used to store the data set {1, 61, 63, 128, 223, 241, 248}.
D. Conflict Detection Engine
The Patricia trie data structure is used as shown in Algorithm 2 to determine
and classify conflicts. Since we know that the layer-3 addresses are fixed length, we
can follow along a path from the root to a matching node to obtain flow entries
that match the layer-3 address space (packet space) of the flow being processed. In
cases of wildcard matches, all child nodes of the matching node will represent flow
2Assuming an IPv4 based environment. An IPv6 environment would be modeled with one Patricia
trie per hextet/quartet in each address
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Figure 6.7: Use of Patricia Trie Data Structure for Octet-wise Representation of
Layer-3 Address.
entries conflicting with the input flow. All detected conflicts are classified as shown in
Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4. Since we formally describe any overlaps involving reconciled
rules as imbrication conflicts, we classify them as such and process them separately
from non-reconciled rules.
Consider a single candidate flow rule r that is being processed by the conflict
detection engine. First and foremost, the engine checks if the reconciled flag of r
is unset. A Patricia trie search is done to determine if there is any flow rule in the
existing table that has overlapping addresses. This search itself is the intersection of
the results of eight different Patricia trie searches.
After the search space has been winnowed, a pairwise comparison is done between
the flow rule r and γ, from the winnowed flow table set. If r and γ have differing
layer-4 protocols, then no conflict exists between those rules, and the loop continues
to the next rule in the winnowed flow table. If it has been determined that r and γ
have the same protocol, the overlap in their address spaces is determined.
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Algorithm 2: Conflict Detection Engine
Input :Rule r, FlowTable f
Output : Conflict-free FlowTable f ′
Procedure ConDet()
1 if !r.reconciled then
2 F ← SearchPatricia(r.l3addr)
3 while Rule γ ∈ F do
4 if r.protocol ! = γ.protocol then
5 return AddFlow (f, r)
6 else if r.addr ⊆ γ.addr then
7 if r.action == γ.action then
8 return ConRes (r, γ, f, Redundancy)
9 else if r.priority == γ.priority then
10 return ConRes (r, γ, f, Correlation)
11 else if r.priority < γ.priority then
12 return ConRes (r, γ, f, Shadowing)
13 else if γ.addr ⊆ r.addr then
14 if r.action == γ.action then
15 return ConRes (r, γ, f, Redundancy)
16 else if r.priority == γ.priority then
17 return ConRes (r, γ, f, Correlation)
18 else if r.priority > γ.priority then
19 return ConRes (r, γ, f,Generalization)
20 else if r.addr ∩ γ.addr ! = ∅ then
21 if r.action == γ.action then
22 return ConRes (r, γ, f, Overlap)
23 else
24 return ConRes (r, γ, f, Correlation)
25 else
26 while Rule γ ∈ f do
27 if r.protocol == γ.protocol then
28 if r.addr ∩ γ.addr ! = ∅ then
29 return ConRes (r, γ, f, Imbrication)
30 return AddFlow (f, r)
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Classification of the conflicts looks at the following conditions:
• If r has an address space that is a subset of γ and their actions are the same, a
redundancy conflict has been detected.
• If r has an address space that is a subset of γ and their actions are different
then their relative global priorities determine the conflict. If priority of r is lower
than γ the conflict is classified as shadowing, but if they have the same priority
then the conflict is classified as a correlation.
• If γ has an address space that is a subset of r and their actions are the same, a
redundancy conflict has been detected.
• If γ has an address space that is a subset of r and their actions are different
then their relative global priorities determine the conflict. If priority of γ is
lower than r the conflict is classified as generalization, but if they have the same
priority then the conflict is classified as a correlation.
• If r and γ have overlapping address spaces but neither is a subset of the other,
then similar action between the two flow rules will be classified as an overlap
and different actions are classified as correlation.
Once the conflicts have been identified, the conflict detection engine encodes this
information using CSV, with each comma separated value showing the unique identifier
of the rule that has a conflict, and the type of conflict. The snippet in Listing 6.2
shows the results from using rule #1 and rule #2 from Table 3.1 as a candidate flow
rule to the flow table consisting of rules #3 through rule #9.
Listing 6.2: Detected Conflicts Encoded as a CSV
1, 3. overlap; 4. shadow; 5. shadow; 6. correlation; 7. generalization;
9. correlation
2, 3. generalization; 4. generalization; 5. generalization; 6.
generalization; 7. generalization; 9. generalization
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E. Conflict Resolution Engine
Once the conflicts between different flow rules have been detected, the conflict
resolution process attempts to resolve these. The intelligible conflicts are resolved
trivially and the interpretative conflicts are resolved using the resolution strategy
that was determined by the administrator. Since resolution of interpretative conflicts
is lossy, Brew has a manual mode, where administrator input using the conflict
visualization functionality offered in the OFAnalyzer to help guide an informed
decision. Visualization aids such as Figure 6.8 and Figure 6.9 assist administrators in
making an educated decision regarding resolution of interpretative conflicts.
F. Visualization Engine
Visualization of conflict data from the OFProcessor was performed using D3.js
JavaScript [138] and JSON libraries [139]. Results from the OFProcessor are obtained
as a list of JSON objects, and are prepared for visualization using JavaScript con-
version routines. Multiple visualization schemes then display this information to the
administrator in a manner of his/her choosing, with a goal to display the information
in a manner that is both intuitive and concise. The visualization engine is implemented
as a module under the DLUX [127] user interface.
A hierarchical edge bundling [140] is used to represent the rule relationships using
D3.js. This scheme highlights the overall relationship between all the flow entries
while simultaneously reducing clutter. Figure 6.8 shows an example of the hierarchical
edge bundling structure showing conflicts in a flow table, with the color of link
distinguishing between the relationship between the rules. By hovering over the rule
numbers that populate the perimeter of the circle in Figure 6.8, all flow rules that
conflict that specific rule are highlighted. The color schemes indicate the priority of
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Algorithm 3: Conflict Resolution Engine
Input :Rule r, Rule γ, FlowTable f , String ConflictType
Output : Conflict-free FlowTable f ′
Procedure ConRes()
1 if ConflictType == Shadowing || ConflictType == Redundancy then
2 return f
3 else if ConflictType == Correlation then
4 if γ.globalPriority > r.globalPriority then
5 r.addr ← r.addr − γ.addr
6 f ′ ← AddFlow (f, r)
7 else
8 f ′ ← RemoveFlow (f, γ)
9 γ.addr ← γ.addr − r.addr
10 f ′ ← AddFlow (f, r)
11 f ′ ← AddFlow (f, γ)
12 else if ConflictType == Generalization then
13 f ′ ← RemoveFlow (f, γ)
14 γ.addr ← γ.addr − r.addr
15 f ′ ← AddFlow (f, γ)
16 f ′ ← AddFlow (f, r)
17 else if ConflictType == Overlap then
18 r.addr ← r.addr + γ.addr
19 f ′ ← RemoveFlow (f, γ)
20 f ′ ← AddFlow (f, r)
21 else if ConflictType == Imbrication then
22 if γ.globalPriority > r.globalPriority then
23 r.addr ← r.addr − γ.addr
24 f ′ ← AddFlow (f, r)
25 else
26 f ′ ← RemoveFlow (f, γ)
27 γ.addr ← γ.addr − r.addr
28 f ′ ← AddFlow (f, r)
29 f ′ ← AddFlow (f, γ)
30 return f ′
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the conflicting rules. Rules highlighted in green have higher priority than the selected
rule, indicating to the administrator that modifying this rule would not affect the
others. Rules in red have a lower priority than the selected rule, serving to remind the
administrator that any change to this rule would affect packet processing. Clicking on
a rule number would provide details on the conflicts by loading the Reingold-Tilford
tree [141] for that rule. Figure 6.9 shows a screenshot of an interactive Reingold-Tilford
tree that presents the conflict details for a single flow rule in an aesthetically pleasing
and tidy fashion. Hovering over the leaves of the tree would display more details
about the rules, so the administrator can now make an informed decision by cross
checking with those rules. Based on the assumption that the administrator is familiar
with the coloring scheme described above, the administrator would learn details about
the conflicts in red, by clicking on the rule number, and attempt to resolve them first
(assuming administrator based resolution). Further details about the implementation
of the visualization engine is detailed by Natarajan [126].
IV. Evaluation
The modules described in Section III were implemented in JAVA. The L2Switch
project was employed to connect the ODL Lithium controller to the OVS. While OVS
and ODL Lithium support both OpenFlow 1.0 and OpenFlow 1.3, testing was done
only using OpenFlow 1.3. Our implementation correctly identifies flow rule conflicts
and classifies them. Both intelligible and interpretative conflicts are automatically
resolved using the least privilege resolution strategy.
Brew was evaluated experimentally using a 2.5 GHz Intel Core i7 machine with eight
dedicated cores and 16 GB DDR3 memory. The system was hardware virtualization
enabled (VT-x), and running Ubuntu 14.04 OS running Linux kernel 3.1.
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Figure 6.8: Conflict Visualization Based on Hierarchical Edge Bundling Showing a
Spiro-graph.
A. Theoretical Evaluation
Both the conflict detection and resolution algorithms grow in a linear in time,
except for the Patricia trie lookup and insertion time. The time complexity of a
lookup on a Patricia trie depends on the length of the string (constant in our case)
and the number of flow rules; for a total runtime of O(n) [128], where n is the number
of entries in the flow table. In an environment with n atomic flow rules existing in
the environment; and k new candidate atomic flow rules introducing change into the
environment, Brew would have a run time of O(n.k).
89
Figure 6.9: Conflict Visualization Based on Reingold-Tilford Tree.
B. Correctness Verification
OFAnalyzer was evaluated for correctness by providing it with several of rules
that were known to have conflicts. Brew correctly identified flow rule conflicts and
classified them, including transient cross-layer conflicts. The relationship between the
different conflicts were displayed using the visualization techniques discussed. The
classification was manually verified to be accurate.
A simple network with topology consisting of eight virtual hosts in different VLANs,
connected to seven different OVS was implemented on Mininet [142], a tool used to
create rich topologies and instantiate OVS and virtual hosts, using a python script.
Figure 6.10 shows the topology used. A singular ODL controller acted as the SDN
controller. The l2switch project in ODL uses openflowplugin to communicate
between the OVS and the controller using the OpenFlow protocol.
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Figure 6.10: Topology Used for Brew Correctness Verification.
A flow rule table consisting of 100 flow rules was implemented to obtain the desired
security policy and constrain traffic flow. The test dataset had all conflicts present in
an effort to have Brew identify it correctly. The frequency of the different types of
conflicts in this dataset was as follows: a) Shadowing - 10%; b) Redundancy - 10%;
c) Correlation - 20%; d) Overlap - 20%; e) Generalization - 20%; and f) Imbrication -
20%. Manual verification showed that all present conflicts were detected by Brew.
C. Performance Overhead
Once correctness of our work was verified and validated, we analyzed the perfor-
mance overhead of conducting inline rule conflict analysis. Once again, the topology
shown in Figure 6.10 was used for the experiment. The different link bandwidths were
enforced using the tc command on Linux. This setup allows us a fine-grained control
on the network. A large text file of size 1 GB was sent from host A to host D, with a
script attempting to add flow rules into the environment. Figure 6.11 shows the time
taken to transfer the file when flow rules were: a) inserted in a native environment,
without the Brew module running; b) inserted with Brew running, but the rules
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Figure 6.11: Network Performance Overhead.
themselves were conflict free; c) inserted with Brew running, and had intelligible
conflicts; and d) inserted with Brew running, and had interpretative conflicts which
were resolved using least privilege resolution strategy. Each test was run 100 times,
and the transfer time was averaged to obtain the file transfer time for each case, with
the error bars indicating the range of the time taken.
As expected, when interpretative conflicts were to be resolved, the transfer took
longer, due to additional computational needs on the system. Scrutinizing the data
showed that the identification and resolution of intelligible conflicts earlier on in
the chained processing added to this impact. However, the presence of the Brew
module itself caused about 10% increase in transfer time (average of 100 test runs).
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In large SDN-based cloud environments, this trade-off would be acceptable since
having a conflict free flow table will not only ensure greater confidence in security, but
also optimal packet forwarding processing times. However, in small to medium size
environments, this overhead could be substantial enough to deter adoption.
D. Scalability Evaluation
The same input file that was used for verifying correctness (containing 100 atomic
flow rules), on the topology shown in Figure 6.10 revealed the processing time of about
5.6 µs per rule.
Switches (Distribution)
Backbone
Operational Zone (Access)
Figure 6.12: Topology for Scalability Testing (Replicating Stanford University
Backbone Network).
Next, a real-world topology was used to test scalability. The Stanford University
backbone network [74] was used as a representative mid-size enterprise network. The
network consists of fourteen access-layer3 routers connected using ten distribution
3lowest level of the Cisco three-tier networking model [143]
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switches to two backbone routers. The snapshot of the routing tables and configuration
files showed over 12,900 routes, 757,000 forwarding entries, 100 VLANs and 900 access-
list rules. This network was replicated in Mininet using OVS to replace all the switches
and routers, but retaining the connectivity information, as shown in Figure 6.12.
Translating all relevant rules into equivalent OpenFlow rules resulted in approximately
8, 900 atomic flow rules, which were then used to run scalability tests. These 8, 900
flow rules were used as the source to extrapolate and generate flow rule tables of size
10, 000 to 100, 000. The extrapolation process randomly picked out the rules from the
8, 900 atomic flow rule set.
Figure 6.13: Increase in Running Time with Increase in Flow Table Size.
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With an input file containing about 10, 000 atomic flow rules, the processing time
was about 5.6 ms. Rules were further replicated and inserted into the system to observe
growth of computation time. Figure 6.13 shows results from our experiment runs using
different input flow table sizes. Ten different test runs were conducted on flow tables
of size varying from 10, 000 to 100, 000 rules, and the resulting running times were
averaged to get the results in the plot. The results clearly show a O(n) running time
and reveals that Brew effectively identifies flow rule conflicts, and takes corrective
action in spite of the large data sets. Comparative running times for FlowGuard
are obtained from [12]. Run times for FortNox are not available and the algorithm
complexity is not discussed, but evaluation appears to suggest linear growth; albeit
considerably slower (approximately 8 ms per 1, 000 flow rules, as opposed to 0.56
ms per 1, 000 flow rules for our system). Running time evaluation for VeriFlow also
appears to be linear, but considerably greater, with 1 ms per 10 flow rules.
Interestingly, none of the conflicts detected from the Stanford topology was cate-
gorized as Imbrication. This can be attributed to all the rules using layer-3 addresses
for matching, as is customary in traditional environments.
E. Effect of Decentralization Strategies
We studied the impact of the distributed environment on policy conflict detection
and resolution using two different experiments. First, we changed the controllers from
a single controller to 2, 5, and 10 using the host-based partitioning scheme. Using
the same Stanford backbone network data set [74], the effect of moving from a single
controller to a decentralized controller was studied. At each data point of 20, 40, 60, 80
and 100 thousand total rules, the controllers were assigned flow rules equally. As
expected, the running time increased with an increase in the number of controllers,
with Brew taking more than twice as much as it did in a single controller environment.
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Figure 6.14: Change in Running Time for Brew with k-controllers.
However, with an increase in the number of flow rules, the running time in a distributed
controller environment asymptotically approached the single controller scenario, as
shown in Figure 6.14. This is attributed to each controller having to deal with fewer
flow rules as the number is increased. The graph also confirms the intuitive fact that
with increasing number of flow rules, having more controllers improves performance.
Next, we tested a distributed controller scenario using the application partitioning
paradigm. Flows were injected into the controller with weighted priorities giving
flows generated from a simulated security application highest preference. The OF-
Analyzer extracted flows from the different controllers, and the OFProcessor used
the global priorities to make decisions as expected. Similar tests were also run using
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Figure 6.15: Dependence of Flow Rule Conflict Resolution Times on Decentralization
Strategies for Increasing Number of Flow Rules.
the hierarchical controller paradigm with results matching expectations. Figure 6.15
shows the running times for the conflict detection algorithm over the same input set
of flow rules running on an application partitioning, host partitioning and hierarchical
distribution strategies. While all scenarios show a near linear growth in running times
with the number of flow rules in the table, the host-based partitioning scenario was
noticeably faster. We attribute this to the presence of a distributed mesh control
plane for the application and hierarchical/heterogeneous partitioning scenarios while
having a hierarchical control plane in the host-based controller partitioning scenario.
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Chapter 7
CONFLICT-FREE COUNTERMEASURE GENERATION FOR MTD IN
DISTRIBUTED SDN CLOUDS
Techniques that assess the security state of the entire environment, and proactively
make changes to reduce the likelihood of being compromised are known broadly as
MTD initiatives. MTD techniques are facilitated by platforms that provide flexible and
programmable features, and SDN is ideal for this effort. The ease of programmability in
SDN makes it a great platform for implementations involving application deployment,
dynamic topology changes, and decentralized network management in a multi-tenant
data center environment. Implementing MTD measures in an SDN-based environment,
however, leads to scenarios where conflicts could occur between newly inserted or
modified flow rules to the existing policies. Verifying and resolving these conflicts
are time consuming, and gets even harder in a distributed SDN environment, making
it unsuitable in highly dynamic environments. In this work, we provide a flow rule
conflict avoidance mechanism that eliminates this problem in MTD implementations
in highly dynamic SDN environments. Our appliance, named CaCTuS, is implemented
on an OpenDaylight controller and ensures that no two flow rules have conflicts at
any layer, thereby ensuring system stability. Evaluation results show that CaCTuS
could craft MTD countermeasures that were provably conflict free with rules in the
existing flow table, with an acceptable 3% run time overhead.
I. Problem Statement
MTD [144, 145] is a transformative approach to security of multi-tenant cloud
environment that leverages dynamism to create an environment with a changing attack
surface. By presenting attackers with an unpredictable target, cloud service providers
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hope to make it difficult for an exploit to have the desired malicious behavior [146].
The flexibility and programmability afforded in the SDN paradigm can be conformed
to achieve a dynamic defensive strategy based MTD [147] by systematically selecting
countermeasures to prevent or mitigate attacks [148, 149].
In an IaaS cloud, VMs are managed by tenants and may contain various vulnerabil-
ities, thus making them easy targets for attackers. Chung et al. [150] present an MTD
approach to automate an iterative three-step procedure to counter network attacks:
a) network intrusion detection; b) threat analysis; and c) countermeasure selection
and deployment. Chowdhary et al. [102] use an attack graph based vulnerability
analysis model to enumerate all possible attack scenarios, allowing the cloud system
to select countermeasures before identified vulnerabilities are exploited. While policy
conflicts between the proposed countermeasures and existing rule set is checked, and
resolved, the temporal nature of such changes and its timeliness is not considered.
In other words, since verifying and deploying the countermeasure takes a non-zero
amount of time, the system should have strategies in place to reduce the time to verify
and deploy a countermeasure and ensure the system is safe from scenarios where it
attempts to implement countermeasures faster than the system can propagate the
changes through the environment.
The dynamism in MTD gives rise to the need for a framework to accurately, and
in a timely fashion, examine the complex relationships between various hosts and
ensure that any changes made to the environment do not conflict with security policies.
While the timeliness challenge in MTD is actively explored [151], the discussion of
timeliness is limited to ensuring that the MTD system should evolve faster than time
for reconnaissance. Timeliness for system stability is ignored. In other words, ensuring
that the system stabilizes at a fast-enough rate that customers and users do not feel
the adverse effects of the underlying system changes is not researched in any detail.
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Further, in case of an SDN-based cloud environments where each countermeasure
is implemented using accompanying flow rule changes, timeliness is dependent on:
a) verifying that the flow rules do not conflict with existing flow rules; b) adding the
flow rules to the controller; and c) propagating the changes to the OVS. Since the last
two factors are organic to any SDN environment, reducing the time required for system
stabilization requires ensuring that the generated countermeasures do not conflict with
existing flow rules, thereby eliminating the need to run the conflict-checking process.
Since the best of these algorithms are linear in nature to with number of flow rules in
the table, in large distributed clouds, conflict checking of policies is time consuming.
Tackling the timeliness issue in implementing MTD countermeasures in SDN
environments is a two-fold problem. First, ensuring a conflict-free environment is time
consuming. And second, there is no proven way to resolve cross-layer policy conflicts.
Since there are no current solutions that address either of these issues, an ideal solution
would seek to avoid the problem in the first place. As the adage goes, prevention is
better than cure. Thus, the MTD system should seek to produce countermeasures
that are provably conflict-free with current security policies.
A final consideration in implementing MTD countermeasures to SDN environments
involves usability. If the implemented MTD countermeasure were to impact the
functionality of the system or affect user experience because of either the technique
being used, or because of the overhead, its adoption will be limited [151]. To that
end, ensuring that the system stabilizes before introducing new changes into the
environment is paramount. To summarize, through this work the following challenges
need to be addressed:
• Reduce the time to deploy countermeasures in an MTD system by ensuring
that the network address dynamism is within allowed ranges that guarantee no
address space overlap.
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• Propose a mapping schema between layer-2 and layer-3 to pre-empt and resolve
the cross-layer conflicts.
• Ensure that the environment stabilizes and passes user traffic prior to a new
countermeasure being implemented.
II. Moving Target Defense (MTD)
MTD techniques are a proactive approach to security of multi-tenant cloud envi-
ronment that leverages the dynamism in computer systems to create an environment
that has a changing attack surface, with the basic idea being either: a) hiding system
properties that are required by attackers to leverage an exploit; or b) alter system
properties periodically that makes all previous reconnaissance done by attackers moot.
Existing Moving Target Defense schemes can be broadly classified into [152]: a) di-
versity based MTD; and b) dynamicity based MTD. The first class essentially seeks to
enlarge the attack surface while the latter consists of moving the attack surface at
runtime to force a re-evaluation by the attacker. This work pertains to the latter.
Dynamicity based MTD techniques introduce temporal changes to the environ-
ment, which has the effect of rendering previous reconnaissance done by attackers
useless. Network based MTD schemes are discussed in [153, 154, 155] but they require
coordination from the communicating parties, and hence are not suitable for a cloud
environments that are gaining an ever larger share of the market. Antonatos et
al. propose a network address space randomization scheme to offer an IP hopping
approach [156] to protect against hitlist worms. Al-Shaer proposes a more generalized
system that enables IP randomization [157] to keep attackers from knowing the true
location of the systems. Address space randomization was then customized for an
SDN environment [149]. Duan et al. present random route mutation technique which
enables random changes of the routes in a network [158].
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While analyzing MTD schemes, Hobson et al. [151] identifies timeliness as an
important challenge. This is a two-pronged challenge, requiring the MTD system
to evolve faster than time for reconnaissance, and at the same time ensuring that
the system stabilizes at a fast enough rate that customers and users do not feel the
adverse effects of the dynamicity. This work focuses on a timeliness aware SDN-based
implementation of network dynamicity based MTD systems, where the dynamicity is
introduced by IP randomization.
III. System Model
In this section, details of the conflict-free countermeasure generation framework,
including design considerations, assumptions, system models and architecture details
are discussed. The functionalities were implemented into a holistic conflict-free coun-
termeasure generation suite called CaCTuS (Conflict-free Countermeasure generaTion
Suite). Figure 7.1 shows the black-box model for CaCTuS. Section III.B provides a
detailed system level description and Section IV provides implementation details of
CaCTuS.
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Figure 7.1: Black-box Model for CaCTuS.
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A. System Assumptions
This work considers only address hopping based network MTD approach. The
assumptions made are:
• The network address change is transparent to benign users, who do not feel any
impact from the network dynamicity.
• There exists an authentication mechanism between applications that need to
access the API from the address space management module. Since this work fo-
cused on establishing functionality, optimal authentication mechanisms were not
considered. However, without an authentication mechanism in place, exposing
the available address space to tenant applications could be misused by malicious
insiders.
• There exists a mechanism to obfuscate the relationship between the layer-3
address and the systems present in the data center to prevent reconnaissance
done by external adversaries. This could be accomplished by having a NAT type
service at the egress of the data center network.
B. System Components
In this Section, the components that help achieve conflict-free countermeasure
generation using a modularized approach are discussed. The system consists of five
interrelated modules, namely an Address Space Management Module (ASMM), a
Resource Mapping Module (RMM), a Countermeasure Generation Module (CGM)
and a Flow Rule Conflict Resolution Module (FCRM).
1) Address Space Management Module (ASMM): The ASMM is primarily respon-
sible for allocating layer-3 addresses to requesters in contiguous blocks. While the
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implementation in CaCTuS uses IPv6 specifically, it can just as easily by converted to
an IPv4 implementation. Algorithm 4 shows the logical details of the ASMM.
The address space allocation itself uses the Buddy memory allocation [159] algo-
rithm to manage the address space. Borrowing from the memory allocation technique,
the network address space is divided into blocks, of specific size n. Each block has
2n available addresses. Instead of attempting to conserve address spaces, just as in
memory allocation, a block is always split into two equal blocks that are both half the
size of the larger block. This, in effect, creates two blocks that are unique buddies to
each other. When both the buddy blocks are not being used, they are merged together
to form the larger block they were split from. In this implementation, the value is set
as n = 2, giving a block size of 4 IPs, thus, leading to a total of 30 orders1 for IPv4.
When using IPv6 in the address management module, where the address space is 2128,
gave us 126 possible orders.
When the CGM requests a new address space, the ASMM looks for two pieces
of information, i.e. the number of addresses required, and list of current address
space being used. Similar to the Buddy memory allocation algorithm, if a contiguous
address space of an equal or larger size is available, it is provided to the GCM. If
not, a block larger than the requested address space is split into half. This process
continues recursively until a suitable address space is found.
2) Resource Mapping Module (RMM): Functions of the RMM involve implementing
a mapping function between layer-2 addresses and layer-3 addresses, or maintaining a
large MAC-address table. However, deviating from traditional practices, a preset layer-
3 address is assigned to every possible layer-2 address. As seen in Chapter 5, resolving
cross-layer conflict is challenging, owing to the transient nature of the mapping between
1Order is an integer such that the size of a block of order α is proportional to 2α
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Algorithm 4: Address Space Management Module (ASMM)
Procedure ASMM()
Input : requestSize x, currentBlock B
Output : addressSpace A
1 if B == NULL then
2 AllocateL3Address(x)
3 else
4 x← x+B.size
5 FreeL3Address (B)
6 AllocateL3Address(x)
Procedure AllocateL3Address()
Input : requestSize x
Output : addressSpace A
1 reqBlock ← x/blockSize
2 while slot do
3 if slot.size ≤ reqBlock ∗ 2 then
4 if slot.size ≥ reqBlock then
5 slot.useStatus← 1
6 return slot
7 else
8 if slot.size ≥ reqBlock then
9 while slot.size ≥ reqBlock do
10 addSlot(slot.startAddress, slot.size/2)
11 addSlot(slot.startAddress+ slot.size/2, slot.size/2)
12 delSlot(slot.startAddress, slot.size)
13 slot.size← slot.size/2
14 slot.useStatus← 1
15 return slot
Procedure FreeL3Address()
Input : addressSpace slot
1 slot.useStatus← 0
2 flag ← 1
3 while flag do
4 if slot.buddy.useStatus == 0 then
5 combineBuddy(slot.startAddress, slot.size)
6 else
7 flag ← 0
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layer-2 and layer-3 addresses. However, by removing the transient nature of that
relationship, conflict resolution and conflict prevention becomes a manageable problem.
This is accomplished by strictly using IPv6 for layer-3 addresses.
IPv6 specifications call for a 64-bit interface identifier that is either automatically
generated from layer-2 address, or assigned manually. The interface identifier address
is assigned manually, albeit using the layer-2 address. The 48-bit layer-2 address is
turned into a 64 interface identifier by inserting FF:FE in the middle, as per IPv6
convention. However, the address is not made globally unique by flipping the 7th
most significant bit, since this work only uses the addresses locally, with a mapping
back to IPv4 at egress.
3) Countermeasure Generation Module (CGM): A countermeasure is an action or a
series of actions intended to thwart attacks or make the system sturdier against attacks,
wherein network configurations and traffic policies are changed. When needed, one (or
more) candidate countermeasures are chosen amongst many potential countermeasures
for deployment after weighing attributes such as cost, time to deploy, and potential
impact to system performance or availability [148]. While common network-based
countermeasures involve actions on several OSI layers, this work is limited to network
address hopping.
When invoked on schedule, the CGM uses input from the ASMM to generate
countermeasures that are conflict-free. With regards to the current flow rules, any
selected address change can have: a) overlapping address space, but different flow
rule action; b) disjoint address space, but same flow rule action; c) disjoint address
space and different flow rule action. In the latter two situations, it is guaranteed that
the environment remains free of flow rule conflicts since the address space is disjointed.
In situations where the same address space is returned from the ASMM, the CGM
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requests a new address space. This simple asynchronous check was introduced to
alleviate concerns in a distributed controller scenario, where due to the controller code
the ASMM might not be in sync.
When the system is under attack, the CGM can quickly introduce change into the
environment, with the trade-off that conflicts may be introduced into the environment.
These conflicts may be resolved at a later time using the Brew framework from
Chapter 6.
4) Flow Rule Conflict Resolution Module (FCRM): Since flow rules with conflicting
actions are avoided, the FCRM only has to reconfigure the conflicting flow rules to
remove address space overlaps. The Brew framework discussed in Chapter 6 serves as
the FCRM.
IV. Implementation
Figure 7.2 shows the logic flow in the system, implemented in an SDN environment
using ODL controller. The CMG module generates the flow rules required that would
implement MTD. MTD countermeasures in the system are invoked in one of two
different ways: a) if the time since the implementation of the last MTD measure is
above a certain threshold; or b) an attack trigger has been set due to the environment
detecting it is under attack. The strategy in both cases is not markedly different.
However, when the system is under attack, the CGM picks the MTD countermeasure
most likely to stop the attack without concern for its potential to cause conflict.
Thus, the system prioritizes the implementation of any MTD strategy over finding
the optimal strategy. When the system is not under attack, the system utilizes the
ASMM to generate an MTD solution over address spaces that guarantee no conflict.
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Figure 7.2: System Logic Flow in CaCTuS.
In dynamic SDN environments, a potential issue is countermeasure bounce. Analo-
gous to a flickering light bulb, situations may arise in which the system may react to
a transient attack event by reconfiguring from state S0 to a different state S1, only
to encounter another event and attempt to revert to the original state S0. Since the
system stabilization after each reconfiguration takes a minimum of non-zero time t,
such a scenario would cause system instability potentially placing the system in a
death spiral. This situation is handled by implementing a wait timer for generation of
new countermeasures. While this value is currently configurable, learning this value
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for an environment using machine learning techniques is has great potential.
In situations where the best MTD measure was not implemented due to either
the system being under attack, the potential for conflicts being present in the system
exists. These are addressed by the FCRM by combining/splitting out flow rules that
are affected by the conflicts.
V. Evaluation of CaCTuS
Evaluation of CaCTuS was done in a multi-faceted manner. First, the hypothesis
that generating multiple flow rules would result in address space overlap which in turn
would lead to flow rule conflicts was tested. Next, the effectiveness and correctness of
CaCTuS was evaluated. Following that, the running time for CaCTuS was compared
to flow rule conflict resolution mechanisms, and the effect of block size on computation
time and address space utilization was studied. Finally, the overhead due to CaCTus
was measured in an environment using file transfer time as the metric, and a comparison
was made to the overhead added by the Brew module. The results show the promise
CaCTuS holds in a highly dynamic SDN environment implementing address hopping
as an MTD strategy.
The first experiment evaluated the prevalence of address space overlaps during
countermeasure generation. To effectively demonstrate the probability of conflict,
IPv4 was used instead of IPv6, since an address space collision using IPv6 address
space would require about 2.6× 1018 flow rules for a 1% collision (birthday paradox).
The result is shown in Figure 7.3.
109
Figure 7.3: Change in Probability of Flow Rule Conflicts with Flow Table Size.
The next experiment focused on the effectiveness of the flow rule conflict prevention.
The topology shown in Figure 6.10 was implemented on Mininet using a python script.
ODL Lithium was used as the OpenFlow controller and the L2Switch project was
employed to connect to the OVS. Since the test topology consisted of only eight hosts,
the network address space was limited to having only 16 possible addresses. Given
the simplified system, it is expected that flow rules use overlapping address spaces
about half the time. Correctness was provably demonstrated over the course of 100
test runs, when CaCTuS produced MTD schemes without any conflicts, while natively
47 of the 100 runs produced flow rules using an overlapping address space.
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Next, the running time of CaCTuS was compared against flow rule conflict detection
tools and plotted in Figure 7.4. CaCTuS compares favorably to Brew (discussed in
Chapter 6) and FlowGuard [12] at larger number of flow rules. This appears intuitive
when looked into in conjunction with results from Figure 7.3 since the probability
of conflicts occurring in a system rise exponentially with an increase in the number
of flow rules. Experiments performed were based on a real-world network topology
derived from the Stanford network as obtained by Kazemian et al. [74]. The ASMM
module grew in a O(log n) manner. As with Brew, the experiments were run on a 2.5
GHz Intel Core i7 machine with 16 GB DDR3 memory.
Figure 7.4: Comparison of CaCTuS Running Time with Brew and FlowGuard Versus
Size of Flow Rule Tables.
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With an input file containing about 10, 000 flow rules, the processing time was
about 11 ms. Rules were further replicated and inserted into the system to observe
growth of computation time. Ten different test runs were conducted on flow tables
of size varying from 10, 000 to 100, 000 rules, and the resulting running times were
averaged to get the results in the plot. Error bars indicate the max-min value from
the different runs.
The next experiment consisted of evaluating the effect of address block size in
the ASMM, to computation time, and total space utilization. Once again, for testing
purposes, we utilized IPv4 instead of IPv6, with block sizes of 2, 4 and 8. We tested
the computation time and total space utilization for 100 thousand, 500 thousand
and 1 million randomly generated address spaces. The results reaffirmed what has
been known about the Buddy Algorithm and showed that the smaller the block size,
the higher the total space utilization. However, smaller block size also accounted for
higher computational overhead. Thus, selecting the optimum block size is dependent
on user preferences.
The final consideration was performance overhead of the CaCTuS module. Using
transfer of a large 1GB file between hosts A and D in Figure 6.10 as the parameter,
CaCTuS was compared to Brew to measure the overhead to file transfer time. Figure 7.5
shows the time taken to transfer the file in cases where the rules being inserted
a) natively; b) through Brew; and c) through CaCTuS. Each test was run 100 times,
and the transfer time was averaged to obtain the file transfer time for each case, with
the error bars indicating the range of the time taken. CaCTuS added about a 3%
increase in transfer time (average of 100 test runs), which is markedly better than
Brew.
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Figure 7.5: Network Performance Overhead for CaCTuS.
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Chapter 8
CONCLUSION
Network trends such as the ever-increasing number of mobile users, BYOD en-
vironments, increased focus on addressing insider threats and the need to control
flow of information between tenants in a hosted data center environment pose a new
set of challenges that can be addressed by SDN. Recent advances in SDN creates a
unique opportunity to enable complex scientific applications to run on a dynamic
and tailored infrastructure that includes compute, storage and network resources.
This approach provides the performance advantages of strong infrastructure support
with little management and deployment costs. With several threat vectors for SDN
environments already identified, and new threats being developed/discovered every
day, comprehensive security implementation in SDN environments is an issue that
needs to be dealt with actively and urgently [118].
To effectively implement security policies, it is often necessary to use several sets of
rules on firewalls and other security devices. The presence of multiple devices, especially
in a multi-vendor distributed environment leads to conflicts in configuration, which
very likely degrade the network security policy and leave room for error. Identifying
and removing these conflicts is a serious and complex problem [121]. Multi-tenant
data center environments where there are multiple origination points for higher level
security policies exacerbates this problem.
Traditional approaches to addressing security issues in such dynamic and distributed
environments tried to implement security on individual components, and did not
consider security holistically. In a multi-tenant SDN-based cloud environment, the
presence of various such security applications and network nodes interacting with each
other makes it extremely difficult to manage policies and track policy conflicts.
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In this dissertation, a formalism is presented to describe and classify all potential
flow rule conflicts in an SDN-based environment including the introduction of a
new class that describes cross-layer flow rule conflicts. A methodology that realizes
this formalism is presented, and implemented using a controller-based algorithm
in a framework called Brew. Flow rules in a distributed controller environment are
extracted, and intra- and inter-table flow rule conflicts are detected utilizing cross-layer
conflict checking. Further, security enforcement is augmented by including strategies
to resolve conflicts in an SDN-based cloud environment. Automatic and assisted
conflict resolution mechanisms are addressed and a novel visualization scheme for
conflict representation is presented. The run time complexity for the framework is
linear, and hence scalable to large SDN-based clouds. However, realizing the need for
flow rule conflict avoidance to overcome the timeliness factor for network based MTD,
CaCTuS seeks to produce non-overlapping address spaces thereby ensuring that MTD
countermeasures being implemented into a system are demonstrably conflict free.
To summarize, this dissertation describes work done to:
• Extend firewall rule conflict classification in a traditional environment to SDN
flow rule conflicts by identifying cross-layer conflicts (which tend to be transient
in nature).
• Include techniques for global prioritization of flow rules in a decentralized
environment depending on the decentralization strategy.
• Detects flow rule conflicts in a multiple, decentralized controller based SDN-based
cloud environments.
• Description of strategies for unassisted resolution of the flow rule conflicts, with
analysis of their benefits and deficiencies.
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• Present a novel visualization scheme implemented to help the administrators
view flow rule conflicts visually.
• Introduce an address space management framework to generate conflict free
countermeasures while implementing an address hopping based network MTD
solution.
I. System Limitations
As with any prototype, Brew is not without limitations. In its current avatar, it
is unsuitable in a highly dynamic environment because the conflict resolution model
that considers temporal nature of the mapping between different address layers in
a dynamic SDN cloud is abecedarian. Currently, the topology of the environment
is not considered while detecting conflicts, which might be valuable information to
possess while determining conflicts in a multi-tenant environment with similar internal
addressing schemes.
While CaCTuS can ensure generation of conflict free countermeasures, it is cur-
rently limited to address hopping based MTD solution. To make it truly robust, its
functionality needs to be expanded to guaranteeing conflict free countermeasures for
all network based MTD solutions.
II. Future Work
The work completed thus far has enabled us to obtain a solid foundation to having
a platform that can ensure a conflict free security policy implementation across a
distributed SDN environment. However, prior to project maturation, we seek to
address some deficiencies in the work including scalability and usability concerns. We
anticipate on improving Brew in the ways described below.
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In the short term, making Brew work with SDN controllers other than ODL would
back up one of the design requirements that the framework be SDN controller agnostic.
This would not only help enhance adoption of the framework, but it would help add
controller diversity in an SDN based MTD implementation. Since a dynamic SDN
cloud could have several new flow rules generated every second, we plan on studying
the effect of using multiple analyzers to share the work load to parallelize processing.
However, parallelization would take resources away from the resource constrained
controller. Thus, we would need to find the circumstances which would warrant
parallelization, and its benefits. To increase robustness and to be more complete,
adding the topology as an input into Brew might be able to make the conflict detection
more thorough.
Our current implementation uses eight octet-wise Patricia trie lookup to identify
address space overlap. We plan on investigating the size of flow tables that would
start showing benefits for going this route. Alternately, using hashed Patricia tries, or
other data structures which might be more efficient for lookups will also be considered.
Alternate ways to potentially increase the efficiency of the conflict detection engine to
sub linear running time using more efficient and customized data structures will be
researched.
Next, we plan on integrating results from studies that incorporate stateful func-
tionality into the SDN environment. Evolving from a pure packet filter based security
application to one that can have rules based on connection state would greatly en-
hance the effectiveness of security policy that can be implemented. Research from the
traditional networking environment suggests this may not be very complex [160].
Verifying that new flow policies adhere to organizational security policies is a
twofold problem: a) establish that the newly generated flow rules do not conflict with
existing flow rules; and b) ensure that the conflict-free flow rule table adhere to the
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high-level organizational policies. Brew addresses the first of these problems. To ensure
compliance with higher level organizational policies, the work in this dissertation
needs to be adapted/extended to work in the area of regulatory compliance. Such
work usually uses a policy specification language based on a restricted subset of First
Order Temporal Logic (FOTL) which can capture the high-level requirements, and
encode what adherence to the policies mean [161, 162]. Combining this work with
FOTL would greatly increase the future applications of the framework.
Further, we plan on considering flow rule optimization based on rule positioning
and examine adaptive prioritization of rules. Including role-based and attribute-based
policy conflicts is a natural extension of this work. Future visualization work includes
upgrades to provide newer features to assist in scalability. A zoom-in/zoom-out
feature aiding in the visualization process and graphs depicting the statistical data
gathered from the switches using the OpenFlow protocol could be added. Since a
one-size fits all solution rarely works, flavors of the Brew framework tailored for host
based SDN firewalls and a mobile (lightweight) solution for tactical clouds would be
a potentially interesting extension of the current work. And finally, using machine
learning algorithms to identify MTD timer thresholds would help CaCTuS deliver
environment-optimized results.
As it stands, Brew is a standalone flow rule conflict detection and resolution
framework. However, work is currently underway to integrate Brew into a MTD
solution, along with CaCTuS to ensure that countermeasures generated do not cause
conflicts in the environment. This would also involve making CaCTuS more robust by
guaranteeing conflict free rules over MTD techniques other than address hopping.
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The following lists all the default match fields for a rule in OpenFlow v1.3.1 [86].
Argument Description Required Field?
OFPXMT_OFB_IN_PORT Switch input port 3
OFPXMT_OFB_IN_PHY_PORT Switch physical input port
OFPXMT_OFB_METADATA Metadata passed between tables
OFPXMT_OFB_ETH_DST Ethernet destination address 3
OFPXMT_OFB_ETH_SRC Ethernet source address 3
OFPXMT_OFB_ETH_TYPE Ethernet frame type 3
OFPXMT_OFB_VLAN_VID VLAN ID
OFPXMT_OFB_VLAN_PCP VLAN priority
OFPXMT_OFB_IP_DSCP IP DSCP (6 bits in ToS field)
OFPXMT_OFB_IP_ECN IP ECN (2 bits in ToS field)
OFPXMT_OFB_IP_PROTO IP protocol 3
OFPXMT_OFB_IPV4_SRC IPv4 source address 3
OFPXMT_OFB_IPV4_DST IPv4 destination address 3
OFPXMT_OFB_TCP_SRC TCP source port 3
OFPXMT_OFB_TCP_DST TCP destination port 3
OFPXMT_OFB_UDP_SRC UDP source port 3
OFPXMT_OFB_UDP_DST UDP destination port 3
OFPXMT_OFB_SCTP_SRC SCTP source port
OFPXMT_OFB_SCTP_DST SCTP destination port
OFPXMT_OFB_ICMPV4_TYPE ICMP type
OFPXMT_OFB_ICMPV4_CODE ICMP code
OFPXMT_OFB_ARP_OP ARP opcode
OFPXMT_OFB_ARP_SPA ARP source IPv4 address
OFPXMT_OFB_ARP_TPA ARP target IPv4 address
OFPXMT_OFB_ARP_SHA ARP source hardware address
OFPXMT_OFB_ARP_THA ARP target hardware address
OFPXMT_OFB_IPV6_SRC IPv6 source address 3
OFPXMT_OFB_IPV6_DST IPv6 destination address 3
OFPXMT_OFB_IPV6_FLABEL IPv6 Flow Label
OFPXMT_OFB_ICMPV6_TYPE ICMPv6 type
OFPXMT_OFB_ICMPV6_CODE ICMPv6 code
OFPXMT_OFB_IPV6_ND_TARGET Target address for ND
OFPXMT_OFB_IPV6_ND_SLL Source link-layer for ND
OFPXMT_OFB_IPV6_ND_TLL Target link-layer for ND
OFPXMT_OFB_MPLS_LABEL MPLS label
OFPXMT_OFB_MPLS_TC MPLS TC
OFPXMT_OFP_MPLS_BOS MPLS BoS bit
OFPXMT_OFB_PBB_ISID PBB I-SID
OFPXMT_OFB_TUNNEL_ID Logical Port Metadata
OFPXMT_OFB_IPV6_EXTHDR IPv6 Extension Header
Table A.1: Flow Table Match Fields.
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The following is a list of actions that may be associated with flow entries in
OpenFlow v1.3.1 [86].
Argument Description
OFPAT_OUTPUT Output to switch port
OFPAT_COPY_TTL_OUT Copy TTL “outwards”from next-to-outermost to outermost
OFPAT_COPY_TTL_IN Copy TTL “inwards”from outermost to next-to-outermost
OFPAT_SET_MPLS_TTL MPLS TTL
OFPAT_DEC_MPLS_TTL Decrement MPLS TTL
OFPAT_PUSH_VLAN Push a new VLAN tag
OFPAT_POP_VLAN Pop the outer VLAN tag
OFPAT_PUSH_MPLS Push a new MPLS tag
OFPAT_POP_MPLS Pop the outer MPLS tag
OFPAT_SET_QUEUE Set queue id when outputting to a port
OFPAT_GROUP Apply group
OFPAT_SET_NW_TTL IP TTL
OFPAT_DEC_NW_TTL Decrement IP TTL
OFPAT_SET_FIELD Set a header field using OXM TLV format
OFPAT_PUSH_PBB Push a new PBB service tag (I-TAG)
OFPAT_POP_PBB Pop the outer PBB service tag (I-TAG)
OFPAT_EXPERIMENTER Experimenter defined
Table B.1: Flow Table Actions.
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The following is a complete list of various abbreviations and acronyms used
throughout this dissertation listed alphabetically.
AAA Authentication, Authorization
and Accounting
PBB Provider Backbone Bridge
API Application Programming In-
terface
PCEP Path Computation Element
Protocol
ARP Address Resolution Protocol PCIM Policy Core Information
Model
BGP Border Gateway Protocol PDP Policy Decision Point
BDD Binary Decision Diagrams PEP Policy Enforcement Point
BYOD Bring Your Own Device PM Policy Manager
CAPWAP Control And Provisioning of
Wireless Access Points
PR Policy Repository
CKT Cyber Key Terrain QoS Quality of Service
CLI Command Line Interface REST Representational State Trans-
fer
CRUD Create, Read, Update and
Delete
SaaS Security-as-a-Service
CSV Comma Separated Values SDN Software-Defined Networks
DDoS Distributed Denial-of-Service SEK Security Enforcement Kernel
DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration
Protocol
SLA Service Level Agreement
DPI Deep Packet Inspection SNMP Simple Network Management
Protocol
DTO Data Transfer Object TCP Transmission Control Protocol
ECA Event-Condition-Action TE Traffic Engineering
FPA Firewall Policy Advisor TTL Time to Live
GUI Graphical User Interface UI User Interface
IaaS Infrastructure-as-a-Service VM Virtual Machine
IDS Intrusion Detection System VLAN Virtual Local-Area Network
IETF Internet Engineering Task
Force
VPN Virtual Private Network
IPFIX IP Flow Information eXport
IPS Intrusion Prevention System
MDL Model Definition Language
MPLS Multi Protocol Label Switching
MTD Moving Target Defense
NAT Network Address Translation
NIC Network Interface Card
ODL OpenDaylight
ONF Open Network Foundation
OSGi Open Service Gateway Initia-
tive
OSI Open Systems Interconnection
OVS Open Virtual Switch
137
